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ABSTRACT 
 
 
KEMALISM MEETS THE COPENHAGEN CRITERIA: THE EMERGENCE OF 
NEO-KEMALISM 
Günay, Defne 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ali Tekin 
 
September 2005 
 
 
Turkey’s long-drawn-out journey came to another turning point after 
getting 3 October 2005 as a date for the launch of accession talks with the European 
Union. This decision made by the Union on 17 December 2004 was an upshot of 
huge steps taken by subsequent Turkish governments in terms of transforming its 
democracy so as to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. This wave of 
democratization inevitably has raised questions about the fate of Kemalism, which 
has been largely penetrated by these reforms. When these reforms are coupled with 
some allegations both from the EU and from within Turkey as being a barrier to 
Turkey’s EU membership, it became inevitable to put Kemalism and its fate into 
interrogation. This thesis aims to answer the question of how and why prevalent 
interpretation of Kemalism is being strained by the EU conditionality that permeates 
fundamentals of Kemalism. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
KEMALİZM KOPENHAG KRİTERLERİYLE BULUŞUYOR:  
NEO-KEMALİZMİN DOĞUŞU 
Günay, Defne 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ali Tekin 
 
Eylül 2005 
 
 
Avrupa Birliği’nin 3 Ekim 2005’te Türkiye’yle müzakerelere başlama 
kararı almasıyla bu uzun yolculukta önemli bir dönüm noktasına gelinmiş oldu.  
Birlik tarafından 17 Aralık 2004’te alınan bu karar Türk hükümetlerinin Kopenhag 
Kriterlerine uyum amacıyla demokratikleşme adına art arda yaptıkları reformların bir 
sonucudur. Kuşkusuz bu demokratikleşme dalgası, bu reformlardan büyük ölçüde 
etkilenen Kemalizmin geleceği ile ilgili sorular oluşturacaktı. Bu reformların hem 
Avrupa Birliği hem Türkiye içinden Kemalizmin Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği 
Üyeliği’ne engel teşkil ettiğine dair ithamlarla birleşmesiyle; Kemalizmi ve onun 
geleceğini incelemek kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir. Bu tez, Kemalizmin mevcut 
yorumunun temel noktalarına temas eden Avrupa Birliği şartlılığı dolayısıyla neden 
ve nasıl zorlandığı sorusuna bir cevap aramaktadır. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kemalizm, Avrupa Birliği- Türkiye ilişkileri, Kopenhag 
Kriterleri. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkey has its eyes set on the European Union (EU)1 membership since the 
conclusion of Ankara Agreement, which is the association agreement signed between 
the European Economic Community and Turkey in 1963. Since then Turkey-EU 
relations has occupied a privileged position in Turkey’s foreign policy. Despite all 
ups and downs in this thorny road, Turkey has always insisted on the EU 
membership. Turkey’s long-drawn-out journey came to a turning point after getting 3 
October 2005 as a date for the launch of accession talks with the EU. This decision 
made by the Union on 17 December 2004 was an upshot of huge steps taken by 
subsequent Turkish governments in terms of transforming its democracy so as to 
comply with the so-called Copenhagen criteria, which are stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the ability 
to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union. Turkish Grand National Assembly amended more 
than one-fifth of the articles of the 1982 Constitution since 1999 and passed seven 
harmonization packages till now that introduced new provisions in areas like the 
legal composition and functioning of the National Security Council (NSC), abolished 
the death penalty, improved individual cultural rights, freedom of expression, right to 
association and peaceful assembly.  
                                                          
1 I will utilize “the EU” to refer to the entire history of the post-war European integration even though 
the endeavor had been named as the European Economic Community (EEC) between 1957 and 1992, 
and the European Community from 1992 onwards. 
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 This wave of democratization inevitably has raised questions about the fate 
of Turkey’s founding ideology that is commonly referred to as Kemalism2, which has 
been presumably largely penetrated by these reforms. When these reforms are 
coupled with some allegations from the EU as being a barrier to Turkey’s EU 
membership with its “fear of the undermining of the integrity of the Turkish state and 
an emphasis on the homogeneity of Turkish culture, an important role for the army, 
and a very rigid attitude to religion”3, it became inevitable to put Kemalism and its 
fate into interrogation.  
Although Kemalism was originally designed as a rather flexible outlook, 
the process of transforming it into an ideology started after the 1950s. Particularly 
the 1980 coup took huge steps in transforming Kemalism into an ideology. The 1982 
Constitution frequently made mention of Kemalism as a guiding ideology by taking 
its six principles as tantamount to an ideology that is closed to revision. This specific 
interpretation of Kemalism (hereafter the orthodox interpretation4) prevailed in the 
policies and the practices of the post-1980 governments. However, the EU 
conditionality that gained strength after Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country 
in the 1999 Helsinki Summit heavily strained this orthodox interpretation by 
                                                          
2 In general terms Kemalism can be defined as Turkey’s founding ideology that is built upon six 
principles— the so-called six arrows, which are republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, 
secularism, and revolutionism. These principles are usually referred to as the founding or state 
ideology of Turkey. See Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United 
States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 1; Haldun Gülalp, “Turkey Questions of 
National Identity,” in New Xenophobia in Europe ed. Bernd Baumgartl and Adrian Favell (London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 358; Gülistan Gürbey, “The Development of the Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement in Turkey since the 1980s,” in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, 
ed. Robert Olson (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 10; and İhsan D. Dağı, 
“Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy,” in Turkey: Identity, 
Democracy, Politics, ed. Sylvia Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 139.  
3 Murat Belge, “Oostlander’s Notorious Turkey Report”, www.turkishpress.com, retrieved on 10 June 
2005. 
4 Orthodoxy is the opinion which adheres as closely as possible to a given set of beliefs. Roger 
Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: Macmillan, 1996), 397. Built on this definition, 
orthodox Kemalism refers to the prevalent, Kemalist ‘ideology’ that has largely taken its ideological 
form after the 1980 military coup. Members of this group regard Kemalism as a dogma and view 
Turkey’s EU membership prospect through this ideological lense. Their views will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter IV. 
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 demanding key policy changes in areas such as the Kurdish question, the Alevi 
question, the role of the military. These demands as well as the idea of limiting 
national sovereignty and sharing competences with the Union institutions in case of 
Turkey’s membership to the Union seriously clashed with the orthodox interpretation 
of Kemalism. There emerged the prospect of the EU membership whereas the 
orthodox Kemalists have been highly sceptical of relinquishing national sovereignty 
in key policy making areas. The EU conditionality pushed Turkey to grant cultural 
rights to its Kurdish originated people and to eliminate the double standard in the 
treatment of the Alevis and other religious minorities, whereas the orthodox 
Kemalists have been in favour of restricting all reflections of Kurdish and Alevi 
identity. The EU urged Turkey to ensure civilian control of the military, whereas the 
orthodox Kemalists believe that the TAF have to oversee Turkey’s political 
development. 
This thesis aims to answer the question as to how and why this orthodox 
interpretation of Kemalism is being strained by the EU conditionality that permeates 
fundamentals of their interpretation of Kemalism. This thesis argues that although 
the orthodox Kemalist interpretation did not aim to and could not accommodate itself 
with the requirements of the EU membership, a neo-Kemalist group started to 
flourish, which could answer the requirements of the EU as well as the changing 
juncture by reinterpreting Kemalism and restoring it in its original form that was an 
outlook. This group by and large argues that Kemalism cannot be a stagnant ideology 
that is not open to change, since its author was a pragmatist and rational leader. With 
regard to the Kurdish and the Alevi question, they have a more liberal position and 
they argue that pragmatism of Atatürk can be used for legitimizing greater freedom 
to use Kurdish. They also regard the compulsory religious courses as a threat to 
 3
 laicism and this way they share the EU’s concerns regarding this issue. Members of 
the neo-Kemalist group commonly reject the dominance of the military in Turkish 
politics and hold that the Turkish society has matured over time. With regard to the 
final problematic issue, the issue of sharing sovereignty with the EU institutions, 
they point that Ataturk himself had accepted limitations on Turkey’s sovereignty for 
the sake of the country’s welfare and peace, and that this reasoning of Atatürk should 
be followed today.  
Exploring the fundamentals of the orthodox interpretation of Kemalism 
necessitates a historical approach since it evolved in the course of time. After 
presenting in Chapter I an overview of how EU conditionality has been penetrating 
into the orthodox interpretation of Kemalism especially after the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit that elevated Turkey’s status to candidacy, the next chapter gives an account 
of Atatürk’s long-term goals and tactics that are embedded in the ‘six arrows’. This 
chapter aims to reveal Atatürk’s basic philosophy concerning the ‘six arrows’. After 
revealing the ideals and the principles that Atatürk prioritized, in Chapter III, the 
historical evolution of the problematic aspects of the EU conditionality, namely the 
Kurdish question, the Alevi question, and the role of the military in Turkish politics 
are analyzed. These issues are analyzed in two frameworks of time- the early years of 
the Republic and aftermath of the 1980 military coup- for the purposes of this thesis 
since these two distinctive periods are indicative of Kemalism and the orthodox 
version of Kemalism, respectively. This analysis is made in this manner so as to 
reveal the rupture from Atatürk’s ideals and practices after the 1980  military coup 
d’etat in those issues. Chapter III also includes another problematic area, the 
limitations on sovereignty, which is also analyzed in a historical perspective. 
Although a significant rupture with the 1980 military coup from previous practices 
 4
 cannot be observed in this particular issue, another major characteristic that the 
orthodox Kemalists have in common is their negative position regarding the EU 
membership and limitations on sovereignty. Thus this issue is also handled in a way 
that reveals the practices before emergence of the prospect of the EU membership.  
Building upon this historical analysis, Chapter IV explains the views of the 
orthodox and neo-Kemalists over these problematic issues. In this chapter, it is 
argued that the prospect of the EU membership was intensified after the Helsinki 
decision to recognize Turkey as a candidate country, and this motive led to a stiff 
wave of reform packages. Thus, a strong pressure for a revision of the orthodox 
interpretation of Kemalism emerged. I present divergent views of orthodox and neo-
Kemalists in order to show how this neo-Kemalist group accommodates itself to the 
EU conditionality and to the prospect of the EU membership, as well as how the 
orthodox Kemalists remain incompatible with the idea of the EU membership.  
Finally I conclude that the emergence or a strengthening of a vocal neo-
Kemalist group is on its way that synthesizes the progressive essence of Kemalism 
and the democratic spirit of the Copenhagen political criteria so as to answer the EU 
conditionality.  
 5
  
 
CHAPTER I 
EU CONDITIONALITY AND ITS IMPACT ON KEMALISM 
 
 
1.1 Historical Evolution of Turkey-EU Relations 
 
Turkey’s first relations with the EU started by the Menderes government’s 
application to be an associate member of the EEC in 1959, right after the Greek 
application in the same year. The association agreement (Ankara Agreement) was 
signed on 12 September 1963. The agreement envisaged completion of a customs 
union between Turkey and the EU within three stages and Article 28 clearly stated 
that full membership could be negotiated after Turkey fulfills all of its contractual 
commitments. Technical details of the customs union were decided in an Additional 
Protocol that was signed on 23 November 1970.5
Turkey’s application for full membership came in 1987 while Turkey was 
pursuing a more liberal, outward oriented economic policy and Turkish industry was 
developing rapidly with the potential of competition with European industries. But 
the Commission’s response at that time was negative. The Commission concluded 
that “it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight 
away" and drew attention to the dispute between Greece and Turkey and "the 
                                                          
5 The Additional Protocol came into force on 1 January 1973. the three stages that were envisaged by 
the Additional Protocol were the preparatory, transitional and the final stage. The Additional Protocol 
finalized the first stage and regulated the passage to the transitional stage. In 1 January 1996 the final 
stage came into force and the Customs Union between the EC and Turkey was concluded. 
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 situation in Cyprus."6 The Commission also pointed that the Community could not 
admit new members before completing its single market, and also that Turkey 
needed to improve itself economically, socially and politically before its accession to 
the EU. Although the response of the Commission was negative; this application for 
full membership revived Turkey-EC relations after a period of cool down and 
suspension due to the 1980 military coup in Turkey and EC’s blocking of the 4th 
Financial Protocol. The Customs union agreement came about after this revival in 
relations. 
On 31 December 1995 Turkey became the only state to complete customs 
union with the EU, without being a full member. Following the Kardak crisis of 
January 1996, relations between Turkey and Greece, and inevitably with the 
European Union were strained. Tense relations were reflected in the Agenda 2000, 
adopted on 15 July 1997, which urges Turkey to “give a firm commitment to resolve 
a number of problems in the region and contribute actively to a just and lasting 
settlement of the Cypriot question”.7  
1997 Luxembourg European Council displayed very well this tension and 
the EU’s overall reluctance towards Turkey’s membership.  EU members convened 
in Luxembourg summit to discuss the enlargement issue as the main item. This 
summit was important for Turkey because the Turkish government was waiting for a 
positive response to its candidacy question. However, the summit was a great 
disappointment for Turkey since the EU did not include Turkey in the accession 
strategy, while setting a timetable for other applicant countries.8 The Council 
                                                          
6 Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, Part II. Par.9 and Part 
III. Par.10. 
7 1998 Regular Report, part b, Relations between the European Union and Turkey, par.14. 
8 The applicant countries that were given a timetable were Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia. It was also stated in the Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions, par. 28  
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 concluded that Turkey was eligible for membership but prior to its accession to the 
Union it had to realize “pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which it has 
embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those 
in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities.”9After this 
disappointment caused by the Luxembourg, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz 
declared that Turkey would not have political dialogue with the EU anymore. 
Official declaration also proposed the continuation of relations on the basis of 
existing agreements, namely the Association Agreement and the Customs Union 
Agreement. After this stake, the revolutionary step in Turkey-EU relations came with 
the 1999 Helsinki Summit, which granted Turkey the candidacy status.  
 
1.2 The EU Challenges Kemalism 
 
Since the Cardiff summit in June 1998, the Union has been preparing yearly 
Progress Reports10 and Accession Partnership documents11 since the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999. These documents are prepared in line with the 
Copenhagen criteria that constitute the basis of accession criteria. Copenhagen 
criteria impose on candidate countries the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that the preparation of negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria would be 
speeded up.  
9 Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions, 13 December 1997, part d. Review Procedure, par. 35. 
10 The Regular progress reports contain a detailed analysis of the progress made by the candidate 
countries. The progress reports are prepared every year by the European Commission for each 
candidate country. The purpose is to identify issues, which will be discussed in detail in the 
negotiations. The European Parliament gives its view on the progress reports, and they are also 
adopted by the European Council. 
11 The Accession Partnership documents concluded by the Council with the applicant countries are 
prepared to assist the candidate country government in its efforts to comply with the Copenhagen 
criteria and they outline the priorities for implementing the Community acquis. The accession 
partnerships are adjusted over time by the Commission. In response to the Accession Partnership 
documents, candidate countries prepare their own National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA), which contains the plans of that country with regards to its integration to the EU. It explains 
in a timetable, how it plans to transpose the conditions outlined in the Accession Partnership 
documents and gives a rough evaluation of its financial and human resources that it needs for realizing 
those conditions. NPAAs can be revised in time like the Accession Partnerships. 
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 democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union. Since the recognition of its candidacy, Turkey has 
been striving to comply with the Copenhagen criteria that were set by the EU. Some 
elements of Accession Partnership documents and Progress Reports clash with the 
orthodox interpretation of Kemalism that has been prevailing since the 1980s, 
especially on the Kurdish question, the Alevi question, the role of the military in 
Turkish politics and accepting limitations on national sovereignty particularly in 
terms of policy making.   
Since the 1998 Regular Report by the Commission on Turkey, the EU has 
been demanding from Turkey full respect to grant cultural rights to Turkish citizens 
of Kurdish origin, recognize the existence of an Alevi identity, downgrading the role 
of the military in Turkish politics so as to align it with the EU practices. The 
Commission repeatedly calls Turkey to find a solution that would include 
“recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the 
ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or 
terrorism.”12 With regard to the Alevi problem, the Commission reiterates that there 
exists a double standard in treatment between those religious minorities recognized 
by the Lausanne Treaty and other religious minorities, including the Alevi 
community in Turkey concerning the compulsory religious instruction in schools, 
which does not recognize the Alevi identity, as well as the availability of financial 
                                                          
12 1999 Regular Report by the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 1.2. Human 
Rights and the Protection of Minorities, Minority Rights and Protection of Minorities, par.1 
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 support only for the building of Sunni mosques and religious foundations.13 The 
Commission reiterates that “the lack of civilian control of the army gives cause for 
concern that is reflected by the major role played by the army in political life through 
the National Security Council”14 in almost every Progress Report since 1998, as well 
as the Accession Partnership documents of 2000 and 2003. 
Although Accession Partnership documents and Progress Reports constitute 
the official conditions and demands of the Union, there exist further documents or 
decisions of other EU institutions, which seriously reveal the clash between EU 
membership and prevalent interpretation of Kemalism, in other words, orthodox 
Kemalism. The most famous one is a report prepared by a European parliamentarian, 
Arie Oostlander. Oostlander report regards “underlying philosophy of the Turkish 
state”15 as follows:  
The underlying philosophy of the Turkish state comprises elements 
such as nationalism, an important role for the army, and a rigid attitude 
to religion, which are hard to reconcile with the founding values of the 
European Union, and has to be adapted in order to enable a less rigid 
and more open-minded cultural and regional diversity as well as a 
modern and tolerant concept of the nation State.16 
 
Other than the Oostlander report there exist many other resolutions adopted 
by the European Parliament in similar fields such as the Economic and Social 
Committee’s report, which suggests that the unity of the Turkish state should be 
compatible with the rights of the Kurds to use and teach their language17 and the 
European Parliament resolution that calls PKK and Turkish government “to find a 
                                                          
13 2000 Regular Report by the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, 1.2. Human 
Rights and the Protection of Minorities, Civil and Political Rights,par.15. 
14 1998 Regular Report, 1.4. General Evaluation, par.1. 
15 It should be noted that in previous drafts of the Oostlander report, the word “Kemalism” was 
explicitly used instead of the term “underlying philosophy of the Turkish state.” Turkish Daily News, 
14 May 2003. 
16 Arie Oostlander, Report on Turkey’s Application for Membership of the European Union 
(COM(2002) 700-C5-0104/2003-2000/2014(COS)). 
17 Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities, Opinion, Relations Between the 
European Union and Turkey, CES 1314/93, Brussels, 22 December 1993. 
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 non-violent and political solution to the Kurdish issue respecting territorial integrity 
and unity of Turkey, while acknowledging the right of Turkish citizens to strive for a 
form of cultural autonomy within Turkey by peaceful means”18 are two of such 
reports and resolutions that are directly linked to the Kemalist principles.  
In response to the Accession Partnership document the Turkish government 
prepared its NPAA in 2000 and revised it in 2003. Accession Partnership document 
of 2000 assured that all obstacles on broadcasting in languages other than Turkish 
will be removed and civilian rule over the judiciary- including the State Security 
Courts will be ensured in the short term; and guaranteed to align the NSC with 
European standards and consolidate every individual’s cultural rights regardless of 
ethnic origin in the mid-term. Its revised version by and large reiterates the mid-term 
guarantees as its short-term priorities. However the outstanding step taken by 
Turkish authorities was to adopt subsequent reform packages that introduced changes 
in almost every area of Turkish politics. The Turkish governments started designing 
and adopting reform packages to comply with the demands of the Union. In October 
2001, a constitutional reform was introduced that strengthened the guarantees in the 
field of fundamental freedoms and restricting the grounds for death penalty. 
Constitutional amendments of October 2001 also made some changes in the legal 
framework of the NSC, by increasing the number of civilians in the NSC, removing 
the representative of the NSC in the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music 
[Kültür Bakanlığı Sinema, Video ve Müzik Eserleri Denetleme Kurulu], and by 
abolishing the extended executive and supervisory powers, such as the Secretary 
General’s following-up the implementation of any recommendation made by the 
NSC. Another amendment provides that the post of Secretary General will no longer 
                                                          
18 European Parliament, Resolution on the Situation in Turkey and the offer of a ceasefire made by the 
PKK (B4-0060, 0076, 0086 and 0089/96), 18 January 1996. 
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 be reserved exclusively for a military person. Among seven harmonization packages 
that were adopted between February 2002 and August 2003, the reform package of 
August 2002 was a landmark event. This reform package abolished the death 
penalty, lifted legal restrictions on individual cultural rights, made retrial possible in 
the light of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, reinforced legal 
guarantees on freedoms of expression and press, eased restrictions on the right to 
association and peaceful assembly, ensured the right to property of community 
foundations belonging to the minorities in Turkey.  
It is important to note that the pace of reforms dramatically increased after 
1999 Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidacy status. This is due to the fact that 
recognition as a candidate country increased the prospect of full membership in the 
eyes of Turkish people and politicians. As Öniş puts, 
Following the Helsinki decision, the incentives to undertake reform 
have increased considerably. The pressures to conform to EU norms, 
as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have created major 
avenues for change in the recent Turkish context in both the 
economic and the political realms.19
 
This “appropriate mix of incentives” in Öniş’s words led Turkey into a 
democratization drive and at the same time into an atmosphere of debate, especially 
concerning the essence of Kemalism and its future. These debates were reflected in 
official documents as well. A report prepared by the Prime Ministry High Council 
for the Coordination of Human Rights Issues [Başbakanlık İnsan Hakları 
Koordinatör Üst Kurulu] in 2000, which included ground breaking proposals such as 
abolishing the ban on use of languages other than Turkish in expression of thoughts 
                                                          
19 Ziya Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU 
Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” in Turkey and the European Union, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry 
Rubin (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 9. 
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 led to the dismissal of its architect Gürsel Demirok.20 Another report prepared by the 
Prime Ministry Human Rights Advisory Board [Başbakanlık İnsan Hakları Danışma 
Kurulu] in 18 October 2004 was fiercely debated and highly criticized. The report 
suggested updating the minority interpretations based on Lausanne Treaty, 
overcoming the ‘Sevres syndrome’ that turned out to be sort of a paranoia, viewing 
EU membership as continuation of Kemalist ideal of civilizationism, and argued that 
even the most innocent identity claims had been perceived as attempts to divide 
Turkey.21 This report was so provocative that two non-governmental organizations, 
the Rule of Law Association [Hukukun Egemenliği Derneği] and the Societal 
Thought Association [Toplumsal Düşünce Derneği], brought the authors of the report 
before the court. One report caused its author’s dismissal, and the other ended up 
with a law suit. These events are illustrative to show how EU candidacy led to an 
increase in the pace of reforms, and aggravated the debates on Kemalism and its 
essentials.  
Aside of the explicit demands and conditions voiced by the EU, there is 
also another aspect of the EU conditionality that raises questions within some circles 
in Turkey: the issue of sovereignty limitation that is embedded in the philosophy of 
the EU integration.  
The EU, as a “post-modern polity”22 seriously challenges the classical 
conception of sovereign state in which the governments has an absolute right to 
control their own territory and independence of all other states in the international 
arena. Its multi-level governance assigns certain tasks to the supranational and sub 
national levels, as well as to the nation states. This extension of sovereign rights both 
                                                          
20 “MGK’nın dediği oldu,” Radikal (Turkish Daily), 23 June 2000. 
21 “Devlete ‘Azınlığa Direnme’ Raporu,” Sabah (Turkish Daily), 18 October 2004. 
22 James Caporaso, “The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory or post-
modern?” Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1996), 30. 
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 to the supranational institutions and sub national institutions puts limitations on the 
nation state’s sovereignty in policy-making. 70 percent of public works spending in 
Europe is decided by the local governments, whereas the single market is managed 
by the Commission that is a supranational institution. The European Central Bank 
governs the monetary policies, whereas after every deepening step the scope of the 
qualified majority voting23 in decision making is increased. This sort of a limitation 
of sovereignty also strains Turkey since it has a deep rooted sovereign state tradition. 
It is obvious that the norms common to the EU members, as well as the 
EU’s demands from Turkey touches upon some basic principles of Kemalism and 
cause severe debates throughout the academia, politics and the society as a whole. 
Before discussing the different interpretations of Kemalism, it is necessary to 
identify what Kemalism really means. Without understanding Atatürk’s heritage, it is 
impossible to assess the validity of its interpretations. The next chapter aims at 
answering questions of whether Kemalism is a closed ideology that sets its eye to 
imprison its adherents, or it is a flexible outlook that was frozen in the course of 
time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 A qualified majority is the number of votes required in the Council for a decision to be adopted 
when certain issues are debated. After 1 November 2004, following enlargement of the Union, the 
QM went up to 232 votes out of a total of 321, representing a majority of the Member States. The 
European Constitution currently being ratified provides for 45 new QMV situations. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEFINING KEMALISM 
 
2.1 Atatürk’s Style of Governance 
 
Atatürk’s governance during the years of national liberation and in the early 
years of the Republic can be categorized into two: his long-term goals and the tactics 
he utilized to achieve those long-term goals. These two categories need to be 
distinguished and further elaborated. 
 
2.1.1 Atatürk’s long-term targets 
 
A common fallacy among Turkish politicians and students of Turkish 
politics is to overemphasize the means Atatürk had utilized to achieve his goals, 
instead of his aims. As Heper puts, Atatürkist state “is not the state that existed 
during Atatürk’s life time, but the state as it was espoused by him”24. Thus, Atatürk’s 
political thoughts and his expressed goals need further elaboration for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
Atatürk and his associates tried to build a secular republic out of the ashes 
of a theocratic monarchy that had left behind an uneducated ummah, while fighting a 
war of national liberation at the same time. During this struggle Atatürk had the 
chance to analyze the reasons behind the demise of the Ottoman Empire and he 
                                                          
24 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985), 48. 
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 started to formulate his own system of political thought. He saw the source of decline 
as personal rule of Sultans, and peoples’ alienation from discussing the fate of their 
country due to long years of Sultanate. In the light of these observations he 
concluded that the people should be awakened from above. Turkish society had its 
own “genuine feelings and desires”, and these feelings and aspirations existed 
regardless of whether or not the people identified them.25  Thus, the Turkish 
reformers namely the Kemalist cadres were responsible from identifying these 
“genuine or real feelings” of the people and directing the people in accordance with 
these orientations since Turkish peoples’ collective conscience had not reached a 
certain level. This outlook towards politics is an upshot of Atatürk’s positivist 
orientation. “Positivists are committed to the belief that there is a knowable world 
‘out there’ that has a structure and form that can be grasped by the competent 
investigator who is value-neutral and committed to nothing but the search for 
truth.”26 In Turkish case this view found its reflection in modernization led by state 
elites from above, through different reforms that were believed to guide people to the 
level of contemporary civilization.  
 
2.1.2 Atatürk’s Tactics 
 
Kemalist principles, namely the “Six Arrows” constitute the means believed 
to lead people to the level of contemporary civilizations, which is the genuine feeling 
of the people. Four of the Six Arrows-- republicanism, laicism, nationalism, 
                                                          
25 Heper, The State, 50. 
26 David Ashley and David Michael Orenstein, Sociological Theory: Classical Statements (Boston : 
Allyn and Bacon, 1990), 55. 
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 populism-- were embraced as the Republican People’s Party’s (RPP)27 basic 
principles in 1927 and other two principles-- etatism and reformism-- were adopted 
by the RPP in the third congress of the Party in 1931, and were incorporated into the 
Constitution in 1937. A brief overview of these Six Arrows will be illuminating at 
this point. 
 
2.1.2.1   Republicanism 
 
 Atatürk had already announced his plan to establish a republic in a speech 
he gave on 13 August 1923. He said “The new Turkish state is a people’s state; it is 
the state of the people.”28 This objective was realized by abolishing the Sultanate on 
1 November 1922; and the Turkish Republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923. 
Republicanism basically means rendering sovereign the national will, 
instead of personal will as it was in the Ottoman Empire. The new state designed its 
policies in line with the genuine feelings of people, while ensuring popular 
participation in the governance.  
Republicanism came about as a reaction to the theocratic monarchy rule in 
the Ottoman Empire. The principle that “sovereignty belongs to the people without 
qualifications and conditions” was a principle set to delineate “not to whom 
sovereignty belonged, but, rather, to whom it did not belong” and Sultan surely did 
not have any share in sovereignty.29 The Sultan derived his legitimacy from God and 
he was the sole authority in government. This regime was attempted to be challenged 
                                                          
27 RPP was founded by Atatürk on 9 September 1923. It is the successor of the Anatolia and Rumeli 
Defense of Rights Organization that led the War of National Liberation against the allied powers. 
After establishing the Republic, Atatürk became the head of the RPP until his death in 1938. The six 
arrows in the party emblem represents these six principles, also known as the Six Arrows of 
Kemalism. 
28 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 
1961), 320. 
29 Heper, The State, 51. 
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 by a Constitutional Monarchy that was set up in 1876. However, this was an 
unsuccessful attempt since the Sultan remained as the sole authority in practice. The 
constitution granted the Sultan the right to disband the Parliament and representatives 
of the people were not influential enough to challenge the powers of the Sultan.30 
Had been aware of the deficiencies of this regime, Atatürk founded the secular 
Turkish Republic, when there were only three other established secular republics in 
the advanced world: USA, France and Switzerland. 
 
2.1.2.2  Nationalism 
 
Nationalism was a crucial component of development, for Atatürk. He said 
in his famous speech on 20 March 1923 that “Let us be aware that a nation which has 
not found her national identity is prey to other nations.”31  
Turkish nationalism was championed by the Union and Progress Party early 
in the 20th century. Ziya Gökalp was one of the proponents of nationalism throughout 
the period. Ziya Gökalp argues that nationalism arose in the second half of the 19th 
century, among Ottoman intellectuals due to the political and cultural decline of the 
Muslim countries and the empire itself in contrast to the development in the West; 
and the dominant ideology, nationalism, showed them the way towards 
development.32 Thus, some of the Turkish intellectuals followed the dominant 
ideology of the West, and embraced nationalism. Though these ideological 
commitments during the second half of 19th century constituted a major source of 
Mustafa Kemal’s nationalism, two sets of ideas bear important differences. Atatürk’s 
nationalism was not expansionist whereas Ziya Gökalp and Unionists had a rather 
                                                          
30 Suna Kili, The Atatürk Revolution (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2003), 98. 
31 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 
1961), 142-3. 
32 Uriel Heyd, Türk Ulusçuluğu’nun Temelleri (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2002),103. 
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 expansionist view, in which they had the goal of unifying all the Turks in Anatolia 
and Central Asia under Pan-Turanist ideology.33  On the other hand, Kemalist elite of 
the new Turkish Republic adopted nationalism as a means of ensuring development 
and overcoming the inferiority complex that emerged after the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire and the wars that it lost.34 The principal goal was to impose a self-
consciousness through an identity based on citizenship rather than religion and to let 
the nation determine its own goals and aspirations.35
A republican regime needs a nation to rely upon and Atatürk created a 
nation out of former subjects of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
2.1.2.3  Populism 
 
Atatürk’s conception of populism can best be inferred from his speech to 
the Grand National Assembly on 1 November 1937: “The essence of the program in 
our hands prevents us from being interested only in certain sections of the citizen 
body. We are servants of all…We do not recognize differences between classes…”36 
It can be argued that Atatürk implied by populism a society without class distinctions 
among its people and equal participation of every individual to the governance. As 
Kili puts rightly, the Liberation War was won by cooperation between different 
classes of the society37, such as the military and civil bureaucracy, local notables and 
landlords, peasants, even some members of the palace. Thus, Atatürk aimed to keep 
this cooperation and unity intact through his idea of populism. As Webster points 
out, “Kemalist policy was/is to make [vertical social mobility] completely 
                                                          
33 Kili, The Atatürk, 314. 
34 Kili, The Atatürk, 308. 
35 Heper, The State, 64. 
36 Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, II, 180. 
37 Kili, The Atatürk, 324. 
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 unhindered, whatever the impediments thereto from abuses of free enterprise.”38 
Kemalist idea of populism has an egalitarian connotation that envisages popular 
participation in governance. Granting women the right to vote and run in municipal 
elections in 1930 and in general elections in 1934, can be seen as an instrument of 
substantiating populist view. 
 
2.1.2.4  Etatism 
 
Victors of the national liberation war were aware that independence could 
only be ensured by economic development. In the Turkish Economic Meeting held in 
İzmir on 17 February 1923, Mustafa Kemal emphasized Ottoman Empire’s closing 
its eyes to economic affairs as a major reason of its decline.39 In the first years of the 
Republic, economic development was hoped to be achieved by adopting liberal 
policies, private sector was encouraged and banks were established to provide them 
with the necessary loans. However, this liberal policy failed due to the economic 
depression of 1929 and the insufficiency of the Turkish private sector. As Cooper 
suggests, Turkish private sector could not accumulate enough capital to establish 
businesses.40 Apart from this, during the Ottoman period, Turks were excluded from 
commerce. Trade was conducted mostly by minority groups, and this caused the lack 
of know-how and technical knowledge among the people of the newly-founded 
Republic. When these problems were coupled with the Great Depression of 1929, 
policy-makers began to seek for alternative economic policies. The closest example 
of a successful economy was standing aside them-- the Soviet Union-- and they were 
influenced by its state-led economy and getting influenced by this model, Turkey 
                                                          
38 Donald E. Webster, Kemalism: A Civil Religion? (n.d., 1979), 48. 
39 Kili, The Atatürk, 340. 
40 Malcolm Cooper, “The Legacy of Atatürk” International Affairs 78, No.1 (2000), 117. 
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 adopted etatism in 1931. Turkish policy-makers developed their five-year plan in 
1933 for industrial development on the basis of the recommendations of a Soviet 
delegation.41  
Atatürk’s etatism envisages an interventionist state, which is active in areas 
of public interest and in areas where private sector is incapable to enter. Lewis posits 
that Kemalist elite never had the intention to collectivize the economy, or 
discouraging the private sector.42 Their primary goal was once again immediate 
development. 
 
2.1.2.5  Laicism 
 
1935 program of RPP illustrates the Party`s and Kemalist elite’s view of 
secularism: 
As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers it to be one of the 
chief factors of the success of our nation in contemporary progress, to separate ideas of 
religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the State.43
 
A modernization program had to be espoused by secularism, since Kemalist 
elite was taking over the sovereignty from religion and giving it to the people. 
Therefore, secularism was a fundamental principle of Kemalism.  
Kemalism was attempting at reforming the attitudes of a society, which had 
defined itself in terms of its emotional attachment to Islam.44  Laicism was an 
indispensable principle for realising a radical rupture from the ancien regime. To 
attain this goal, the new Republic envisaged an interventionist state that tries to 
                                                          
41 Cooper, “The Legacy,” 117. 
42 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 286. 
43 Lewis, The Emergence, 47. 
44 Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “Islam-State Interaction in Turkey”, International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 28 (1996), 235.  
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 detach religion from the social life, as well as from the state affairs. Kemalist laicism 
is significantly different from the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of secularism in which 
the state is neutral in religious affairs. However, Kemalist laicism envisages a state 
that is active in separating religion from the social life.45  
Atatürk had suffered from the association of religion and governance 
throughout the liberation war. Entente powers forced the Caliph to get a fatwa issued 
by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, in order to gather support from the people in their fight 
against Mustafa Kemal and his supporters.46  In the light of these bitter memories, 
Atatürk adopted secularism, while placing it at the center of his reform movements.  
 Ziya Gökalp had been one of the first advocates of secularism before 
Mustafa Kemal. However he used the term la-dini (non-religious) in order to avoid 
using the French word laicism. According to Lewis, usage of this term resulted in a 
confusion between laicism and irreligion, which led to paramount opposition from 
the Muslim clergy.47 However, Kemalist laicism neither meant state’s complete 
neutrality in religious affairs, nor liquidation of religion. Atatürk himself was raised 
by a religious mother and he did not have any inclination towards atheism.48 He had 
two different conceptions of Islam, one of them was the more complicated, artificial 
and full of superstitions; and the one that does not oppose consciousness or preclude 
progress.49 He believed that the first version, which was also dominant in the 
Ottoman Empire should be suppressed and the other one should be promoted. 
 
 
                                                          
45 Kili, The Atatürk, 353. 
46 Yılmaz Çetiner, Son Padişah Vahdettin (İstanbul : Milliyet, 1993) 253. 
47 Lewis, The Emergence, 403. 
48 Vamık Volkan, The Immortal Ataturk : A Psychobiography (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 
1984), 28. 
49 Cizre, “Islam-State Interaction,” 236. 
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 2.1.2.6  Reformism 
 
Principle of reformism was initially instituted to ensure the development and 
modernization of the new state. Reformism guarantees the movement of the state 
towards modernization, it renders Kemalism open to change and innovation, when 
necessary.50  
Mustafa Kemal learnt from the Ottoman case that a state is bound to decline 
if it does not catch up with innovations. With this reasoning he pursued many 
reforms in order to modernize the new Turkish Republic. Thus it can be confidently 
argued that reformism constitutes the most important instrument of Kemalism, which 
targets modernization. As Kili contends, “It is not just to ensure modernization that 
the society, political system and political culture have to be receptive and committed 
to change but also to sustain the continuity of the modern existence.”51 Reformism 
aims to protect Kemalism from dogmatism and render it resilient in changing 
political circumstances. Dogmatism was seen as an obstacle for modernization, 
which is the ultimate goal that was aimed to realize through Kemalist principles. 
Reformism prevents the stagnation and decline of the system by keeping it open to 
changes. 
As Selek points out, reformism has been misinterpreted as it aims to protect 
the existing system by revolting, when necessary.52 However, in its essence 
reformism means to set new goals according to changing conditions and utilizing 
new means to achieve these goals. 
 
                                                          
50 Kili, The Atatürk, 366. 
51 Kili, The Atatürk, 366. 
52 Sabahattin Selek, Anadolu İhtilali (İstanbul: Cem, 1973), 741. 
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 2.1.3 Essence of Kemalism: A Weltanschauung 
 
“I do not want doctrines. They would hinder our progress.”53
I am leaving behind no cliché as a legacy. My legacy is science and 
rationalism. Times are changing rapidly. Claiming that one could 
establish rules which could never be subject to change in such a world 
would be tantamount to denying development of science and mind.54  
 
These words clearly display Atatürk’s intention of leaving behind a flexible 
outlook instead of a dogmatic ideology. What lies behind the formulation of six 
arrows is a reaction against the ancien regime, and the urge to wipe off the hold of 
religion over the society and the state affairs, and what constitutes the core of those 
principles is pragmatism, and scientific thinking. But post-Atatürk Turkish politics 
has evolved in the opposite direction, by getting more stagnant and more dogmatic 
everyday. At this point a plausible question arises in minds as to how Atatürk’s 
pragmatic and flexible outlook was transformed into a rigid ideology. Murat Belge 
maintains that Atatürk merely pointed at some goals to be achieved rather than 
establishing an ideology since he always prioritized change and renovation. 
However, Belge argues that, Kemalism was transformed into a rigid ideology on 
purpose after its author’s death. In Belge’s words,  
today Kemalism, of which the primary goal is Westernization, is being 
used by anti-Western circles as an ideological tool. Likewise, 
Kemalism, which is based on directing the people to continuous 
change, has turned into the most conservative ideology that exists in 
Turkey.55
 
This transformation is ably explained by Metin Heper. Heper argues that 
Kemalism was not designed as an ideology, as in Shilsian conceptualization. Edward 
                                                          
53 Sami Selçuk, Longing for Democracy (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye publications, 2000), 11. 
54 Selçuk, Longing, 11. 
55 Murat Belge, “Kemalist İdeolojinin Özellikleri,” Radikal, 7 October 2003. 
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 Shils demarcates an ideology from an outlook by defining ideology as having an 
authoritative and binding formulation that is integrated around some surpassing 
principles and aims to address each and every question.56 Custodians of an ideology 
claim to be speaking on behalf of a higher entity that is treated as sacrosanct. On the 
other hand, an outlook lacks authoritative and explicit promulgation, and it consists 
of different views, each of them emphasizes a certain aspect of that outlook they 
belong to but accepts the general premise of that outlook. Besides outlooks are less 
demanding to its adherents, they do not require full compliance with themselves.  
Building upon the Shilsian conception of ideology, Metin Heper classifies 
Kemalism as a “Weltanschauung” rather than an ideology. He argues that “it did not 
for the long run intend to clamp upon society a closed system of thought…and 
longed for a dynamic rather than static consensus.”57 Despite the “-ism” attached to 
his name, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had never been an ideologue. He fervently 
refrained from dogmatizing his views that had been incorporated in the party 
program of RPP, in 1931. He adopted reformism that sustained the dynamism of the 
movement, and he responded to the question why RPP had no ideology by saying 
that if they had one, it would have frozen them. These examples clearly reveal that 
Atatürk never had the intention of establishing an ideology. What he originally 
brought about was an outlook that had the premise of modernization through 
scientific thinking. However, things have changed after Atatürk’s death, Kemalism 
was gradually transformed into an ideology, and the most drastic ideologization 
came alongside the 1980 military coup. 
                                                          
56 Edward Shils, “The Concept and Function of Ideology”, International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, Vol. 7 and 8 (New York: The Macmillan Company&The Free Press, 1972), 66 as quoted in 
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Orient 25, no.1 (March 1984), 85, note 16.  
57 Heper, “A Weltanschauung,” 88. 
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 As Heper observes rightly, 1961 Constitution did not make direct reference to 
Kemalism as an ideology; on the other hand 1982 Constitution frequently made 
mention of Kemalism as a guiding ideology. Article 2 states that the Republic of 
Turkey will be “loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk”58 and the Preamble reads as 
follows:  
No idea or opinion contrary to…the Turkish historical and 
spiritual values, nationalism, the principles and reforms and 
modernization concepts as set forth by Atatürk shall be 
supported.59  
 
One might presume that such a direct reference to “Turkish historical and 
moral values” would connote to a rupture from Kemalist thought that is based on 
positivism, but it is not true. The National Security Council of 1980 coup merged 
Kemalism to a system of thought known as ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ so as to cope 
with political polarization, which established different camps centered around 
different ideologies. 
Unlike the previous military interventions, the 1980 coup had its own 
ideology that was to be inculcated to the society so as to restore the order in society. 
This ideology is known as the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”, which was originally 
formulated by a club of intellectuals, which was named ‘The Intellectuals’ Hearth’ in 
the late 1960s.60 Opinions and adherents of this club have a great deal of importance, 
because many policies of post-1980 governments were rooted in the Hearth’s 
opinions, and many members of the club had been appointed as high-ranking 
bureaucrats after the 1980 coup. 
                                                          
58 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, part 1, Article 2. 
59 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Preamble. The phrase “no idea or opinion” was 
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 Members of the club believed that the history of the Turks had to be rewritten 
with special emphasis on pre-Islamic Turkish culture and its combination with Islam. 
They contend that pre-Islamic Turkish culture gave Turks certain values such as the 
fear of God, patriotism, love of the family, obedience and respect for customs; and 
they suggest that divergence from this culture for the sake of imitation of the West 
caused corruption and disorder in the society.61 They regard Western style of 
education as primary source of disorder, and they suggest placing emphasis on 
Turkish and Islamic values in education and bolstering national art and music. They 
regard placing emphasis on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis through means of mass 
media, education and state planning as a cement that would reunite Turkish people. 
Consequently this synthesis was injected into Kemalism, which was previously a 
flexible outlook based on science and technology, and transformed it into a hard 
ideology that had a prescription for all kinds of problems in political and social life. 
In Toprak’s words, 
Both the legislation and the political discourse of the post-1980 
period have revolved around the key concepts of national unity, 
ideological uniformity, social peace and political stability. These 
aims were to be achieved by a general process of depoliticization, 
coupled with a concerted effort to socialize the new generations 
within the framework of the ideals set forth in the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis. 62
 
A set of practices followed adoption of this formula: the Ministry of 
Education sent to schools a declaration stated that the Darwinian theory was based on 
scientific deception, the teaching of logic and philosophy in high schools was made 
optional whereas Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution made religious culture and 
moral education compulsory in primary and secondary schools, the canteens of 
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 several ministries were closed during Ramazan,63 Article 26 of the Constitution 
prohibited use of some languages including Kurdish in the expression and 
dissemination of thought and strained any kinds of reflections of ethnic and sectarian 
differences, and the Higher Education Council was instrumental in carving the 
educational system in line with this new philosophy.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMATIC ISSUES 
 
This chapter gives an account of how ideologization and in Heper’s words 
“bureaucratization” of Kemalism occurred in the issues that are subject to the EU 
conditionality and that are the most important cases where ideologization of 
Kemalism revealed itself in the course of time. These issues are the Kurdish 
question, the Alevi question, the role of the military in Turkish politics, and limiting 
sovereignty that is directly linked to the EU membership. This chapter reviews the 
evolution of these issues, with special emphasis on the early Republican period and 
aftermath of the 1980 coup, so as to reveal the rupture from Kemalist outlook after 
the 1980 coup.  
 
 
3.1 Historical Evolution of the Kurdish Question 
 
3.1.1   Genesis of the issue 
 
The end of World War I had detrimental effects on the Central states that 
lost the war. Germany and Austria were driven into political and economic chaos by 
harsh peace settlements. Ottoman Empire also shared this fate, Allied powers were 
seeking to divide Ottoman land according to secret wartime agreements they had 
made. 
 29
 According to those secret wartime agreements, all Ottoman land except 
Central Anatolia and Black Sea coasts were to be shared by Britain, France and 
Russia; and Mudros armistice that was signed in 1918 gave Allied powers the pretext 
they needed to start the invasion. However, the Bolshevik revolution toppled the 
empire in Russia and a Soviet government was formed. Newly formed Soviet 
government gave up on their claims over Southeastern Anatolia and revealed the 
secret wartime agreements. British and French decision to stick to the original 
agreements led to conflicts in Southeastern Anatolia, since Russian withdrawal 
brought to surface the conflicting interests in the region as to who would be in 
control. Paris Peace Conference (18 January 1919) turned out to be an arena for these 
rival groups. Two groups bear relatively more importance with regard to the basic 
direction of this thesis: the Armenians, and the Kurds.  
The Armenians and the Kurds were after the same goal of having total 
control over Southeastern Anatolia. Armenians had a stronger voice during the Peace 
Conference since Kurdish tribes were fragmented. Some Kurdish tribes were 
enchanted by the Istanbul government’s promise of full autonomy; and some tribes 
maintained their silence by Mustafa Kemal’s offer to grant them equality within the 
new Turkish state that he was creating in return for their loyalty to the Empire’s 
territorial integrity.64 Thus, Kurdish areas in Southern Caucassus, Iraq and Eastern 
Anatolia “were being inexorably divided by the Peace Conference to satisfy 
everyone except the Kurds.”65 Urumiye area was being incorporated to Iran, and 
Mosul, Arbil, Suleymaniye and Kirkuk were being annexed to the British mandate of 
Iraq, with all their Kurdish population.  
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 In order to succeed in these plans, the British politicians had to garner 
support from those Kurdish tribes who were to be incorporated into Iraq. Therefore, 
British intelligence started to provoke these tribes no later than March 1919, by 
touching upon their nationalist feelings and arousing aspirations of an independent 
Kurdish state. In the meantime Mustafa Kemal was very well aware that making a 
distinction between ‘Kurdish regions’ and ‘Turkish regions’ and establishing an 
independent Kurdish state over those so-called ‘Kurdish regions’ would have borne 
disastrous effects on the Turkish national struggle, since such an arrangement would 
divide the territory that was to be defended by the Turkish militias as a part of the 
National Pact. He was trying to place emphasis on the unmanageability of 
establishing and governing an independent Kurdish state in the region, since it was 
impossible to distinguish Kurdish populated areas from Turkish populated areas. In a 
telegram he sent to Kamil, a Kurdish deputy in the Ottoman parliament, Mustafa 
Kemal expressed his resentment from the disputes between the Turks and the Kurds 
in Diyarbekir, and he said that such incidents would be harmful to both “brothers-in-
race.”66 At that time Mustafa Kemal’s basic aim was to “include them [the Kurds] 
within the melting pot of a common Turkish, Muslim nationality.”67  
Kurdish tribes’ attitude towards the liberation movement was quite 
fragmented during the period. The basic motive of the Kurdish tribes who supported 
Turkish national liberation movement was their fear of an independent Armenian 
state coming into being in Southeastern Anatolia. When Şerif Pasha, who was the 
Kurdish representative to the Paris Peace Conference, concluded an agreement with 
the Armenians and gave up a large part of Southeastern Anatolia to the Armenians, 
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 many Kurdish tribes’ involvement in the national struggle intensified.68 Besides 
Mustafa Kemal himself and Kazım Karabekir, who was the commander of the 15th 
army corps located in Erzurum, succeeded in ensuring some Kurdish tribes’ 
obedience by offering assistance against Armenian claims over Southeastern 
Anatolia. In a telegram he sent to a Diyarbekir notable, Kasım Cemilpaşazade on 11 
June 1919, Mustafa Kemal argues that all Muslim components of the society should 
cooperate closely to prevent the partition of the Ottoman land, and that he was “in 
favor of granting all manner of rights and privileges in order to ensure the attachment 
and the prosperity and progress of our Kurdish brothers, on condition that the 
Ottoman state is not split up.”69 Apart from their desire to keep the Armenians out of 
their region, what unified these groups was their Ottoman patriotism and Islamic 
solidarity. The Kurdish support to the National movement was also reflected in the 
number of delegates in the Erzurum Congress (23 July-7 August 1919) and in the 
Grand National Assembly: 22 of 56 delegates who attended the Erzurum Congress 
and 74 deputies in the Grand National Assembly were Kurds.70 This solidarity 
among the Turkish and the Kurdish delegates was reflected in the decisions taken in 
the Sivas Congress (4-11 September 1919). The Congress agreed upon the need to 
prevent establishment of Armenian and Greek states over Ottoman territory, and to 
protect Caliphate. Besides, Sivas Congress also proclaimed that “all Islamic elements 
living in the abovementioned domains [the Ottoman lands within the armistice lines] 
are true brothers, imbued with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice for each other, 
and wholly respectful of racial and social rights and local conditions.”71
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 Some groups, on the other hand, were still being driven by their aspirations 
for independence. After the Mudros Armistice was signed and Allied Powers 
occupied Istanbul in 30 October 1918, some Kurdish leaders believed that they could 
have a share from the dismembered Ottoman Empire with the help of the British.72 
For this purpose they reactivated Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, which had been 
banned by the Ottoman government. This organization also sponsored many of the 
revolts in Kurdish-populated areas after the Turkish Republic was founded. During 
the period of 1919-21, four out of a total of 23 uprisings were organized by Kurdish 
tribes. The most significant ones were Cemil Çeto, Milli and Koçgiri rebellions.73 
Although eventually suppressed, these rebellions were threatening enough to get 
Mustafa Kemal and his associates concerned on the Kurdish discontent. 
A major debate among the students of Turkish history is on whether 
Atatürk had toyed with the idea of granting autonomy to the Kurds or not, after 
witnessing the Kurdish discontent reflected in the rebellions. Stanford Shaw gives us 
a reliable account of the course of events. He states that Atatürk had expressed such a 
view during the İzmit Press Conference on 16 January 1923, but this passage was 
censored out of many publications of this press conference. He asserts that both 
Mustafa Kemal and The Grand National Assembly had agreed upon Kurdish 
autonomy, in a secret speech delivered on 10 February 1922 and on 22 July 1922, 
respectively.74 Mango also points to the speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal during 
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 the İzmit Press Conference as a signal of his plans with regard to granting autonomy 
to the Kurdish populated areas. The crux of the speech lies in the following sentence: 
As a result, wherever the population of a district is Kurdish, it 
will govern itself autonomously. Aside from this, whenever one 
speaks of the people of Turkey [Türkiye’nin halkı], they [the 
Kurds] should also be included…Now, the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly is made up of empowered representatives 
both of Turks and of Kurds, and the two elements have joined 
their interests and destinies.75
 
This indulgent attitude towards the Kurdish speaking community was 
displayed in the Articles 38-43 of Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923) as well. Article 
39/4 states that  
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish 
national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, 
religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public 
meetings.76
 
Similarly, Article 39/5 guarantees the right to oral use of languages other 
than Turkish before the courts for Turkish citizens speaking a language other than 
Turkish.77
Mustafa Kemal’s references to the multiethnic character of the people of 
Turkey, the distinctiveness of the ethnicities living side by side and the need of 
Kurdish self governance can be traced in many of his speeches delivered from the 
beginning of the War of National Liberation until the year of 1923. However, during 
the committee meetings to draw up a new constitution, the issue of local government 
was not touched upon. The idea of granting Kurdish populated provinces the right to 
self-government was shunted. As Suna Kili suggests, “there was very little 
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 discussion on the section of the Constitution which was devoted to the administration 
of the provinces.”78
Andrew Mango identifies the reason behind this step back in Mustafa 
Kemal’s vision regarding the Kurdish autonomy as a change of priorities.79 He 
correctly argues that Mustafa Kemal had to wield absolute power so as to create a 
secular and modern Republic, and any kind of devolution of power would have led to 
the failure of his plans to wipe off traces of the Caliphate and Sultanate and to 
establish a Republic that has an eye on the level of contemporary civilization. In 
Atatürk’s words, “sovereignty that rests on guns must only be a temporary expedient 
in a time of upheaval”80 and this was the time for it. Atatürk had many rivals from 
inside the country: there was a liberal opposition that assumed transition to multi-
party politics would follow the defeat of the Greek; there was a substantial amount of 
people, who had fought for independence but would resent abolition of the Caliphate; 
and there were perilous rivalries between Atatürk and his colleagues. 
Şeyh Sait rebellion came at a time when Atatürk’s Republican People’s 
Party was being challenged by a vocal opposition.81 The reasons behind this rebellion 
were diverse, a reaction to the centralization of governance, rise of Kurdish 
nationalism, and opposition to abolition of the Caliphate. The designs to create a 
secular state were bound to be contrary to the vital cement that was uniting the 
Kurdish tribes and the nationalist movement. Since the most important commonality 
between them was the desire to save the Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal’s plans were 
inevitably going to lead to a division within the cooperators of the War of National 
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 Liberation. Draconian measures were taken to suppress the rebellion of the Kurdish 
Şeyh Sait and a “Confirmation of Tranquility Law” was enacted in March 1925, 
which gave the government stringent powers against any actual or potential 
opposition.82 In such an environment Atatürk could not have tolerated upheavals 
based on ethnicity claims and he chose to suppress any kind of public expressions of 
ethnicity. The formulation of the Turkish historical thesis claiming that all 
civilizations had taken their roots from the Turkish people and a heavy cultural 
assimilation policy came along with the growing need to assume authority. This need 
led to the incorporation of nationalism by the Republican elite in the RPP program, 
which was to become the state ideology during the following decades. 
Thus, it can be said that the principal goal was to impose self-consciousness 
through an identity based on citizenship rather than religion. Once a nation state is 
formed, traditional modes of governance have to be abandoned in order to compete 
and successfully operate in a system of other nation-states. Thus, as it was in the 
Turkish case, nation building is accompanied with political development, which was 
the ultimate goal of Mustafa Kemal.  
By the 1950s, policies of single-party period started to bear fruit and 
Turkish society had started to become relatively modernized. Alongside the society 
as a whole, Kurdish population had also started to become well aware of their 
ethnicity, and they started to politicize as well. During the Democrat Party (DP) rule 
between 1950 and 1960 relatively liberal policies were adopted, and this liberal 
posture started to relax the strict assimilation policies of the single-party period.83  
DP rule initially ushered in a relatively more liberal period in terms of both economic 
and political liberalization, and this period brought about new chances for the Kurds 
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 to express their grievances. Even the 1960 military coup did not retreat from these 
liberal policies. Although the military regime tried to adopt assimilation policies such 
as replacing Kurdish names of some villages with Turkish ones, the 1961 
constitution had a liberal essence and it protected some basic rights such as freedom 
of speech and association.84
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, reflections of a Kurdish ethnicity were 
even more conspicuous. The New Turkey Party (NTP), most of whose members 
were the notables of the Eastern provinces, garnered more than 30 percent of the 
votes cast in the Eastern provinces in 1961. The Turkish Workers’ Party (TWP), of 
the Marxist left, became the first legally recognized political party that admitted the 
existence of a Kurdish People who lives in Eastern Anatolia.85  
Kurdish population was usually in close cooperation with Marxist or leftist 
oriented organizations and parties. The basic reason behind this cooperation was 
these organizations’ and parties’ recognition of the Kurdish reality. These 
organizations and political parties were further arguing that the economic 
backwardness of Eastern Anatolia was caused by the capitalist policies carried out 
hand in hand with policies that denied Kurdish identity. It was this convergence in 
their views that led to the emergence of many Marxist oriented Kurdish separatist 
groups during the 1970s.86 The most important one of them was the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), which organized its first congress in 1977 at Diyarbakır. 
Their activities came to an abrupt halt due to the 1980 military coup, but were 
resumed in 1984. 
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 3.1.2   Aftermath of the 1980 Military Coup 
 
After the 1960s and 1970s, when Kurdish ethnicity was by and large 
coming to the surface, came the 1980 military coup. The new military regime 
decided to impose Kemalism in the way they had perceived it. As Barkey and Fuller 
put, “the military regime which seized power in 1980 instituted some of the most 
regressive and repressive policies towards the Kurds.”87 They started to place 
emphasis on the indivisibility and uniformity of the nation, and on the ‘Turkishness’ 
of the people.88 The 1982 Constitution was also symbolizing the staunch resistance 
against any reflection of Kurdishness. According to Article 26 of the Constitution, 
“no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of 
thought”89 and in 1983 a law that prohibited the use of Kurdish language was 
enacted. Article 134 reinstitutionalizes the Turkish Language Society [Türk Dil 
Kurumu] and the Turkish History Society [Türk Tarih Kurumu]. Arguments that a 
distinct Kurdish language was fictive, that the Turks and the Kurds had the same 
ancestors, and that ‘Kurd’ is a name given to mountain Turks, started to be heard 
frequently. But none of these measures sufficed to prevent further crystallization of a 
Kurdish ethnic identity.  
In the early 1990s, firm grip on the Kurdish issue had started to ease. The 
most important developments took place during the presidency of Turgut Özal. 
Turgut Özal, who had declared that he had Kurdish roots, was in favor of a more 
liberal policy towards the Kurdish issue and enhanced dialogue between the parties. 
He had ground breaking proposals as early as 1991, such as the need to incorporate 
Kurdish language in the educational system, and granting the right to broadcast in 
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 Kurdish. Thus, the ban on the use of Kurdish language was abolished in April 1991, 
as an adjustment in response to the Kurdish refugee inflow after the Gulf War.90 And 
then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared that he recognized the Kurdish 
reality.91 But these relatively constructive policies came to a halt after the sudden 
death of Turgut Özal. Demirel was elected to replace Özal as President and Tansu 
Çiller became the Prime Minister. After then Demirel began denying the so-called 
‘Kurdish reality’, which once upon a time he had recognized; and Tansu Çiller was 
inexperienced and economy-oriented. Thus, state policy towards the Kurdish 
problem hardened, as the scale of the military operations in the South Eastern 
Anatolia increased. 
Witnessing the emergence of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq, Kurds 
living in Turkey also wanted to take their chance and the vicious conflict between the 
Turkish Armed Forces and PKK accelerated.92 This armed conflict also found its 
mirror image in the political arena during the spring and fall of 1994. The banning of 
the Democracy Party (DEP), which was mostly supported by the Kurds, and 
imprisonment of its eight parliamentarians dimmed off the hopes for reconciliation.  
 
3.2    The Alevi Question 
 
3.2.1  From the War of National Liberation to the 1980 Coup 
 
The Alevi community has historically pursued a low profile position in 
Turkish politics, although they had been denied recognition as a religious creed93 
since the proclamation of the Republic. The basic reason for this ‘invisibility’ lies in 
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 the community’s appreciation of the laicist nature of the Kemalist republic that 
abolished the Caliphate and ruled out the option of establishing a theocratic 
monarchy. In Bodrogi’s words,  
They were willing to accept the fact that they were still denied 
official recognition as a religious community, as long as the 
state generally banned religion from the public sphere and 
therefore also radically curtailed Sunni religious activities and 
institutions. 94   
 
Alevis were the most oppressed community in the Ottoman Empire. Since 
the 16th century, when Kızılbaş upheavals were suppressed forcefully, most of them 
fled away to remote places and closed themselves to the outer world.95 This 
marginalization went on till the break of Turkish War of National Liberation. Alevis 
welcomed the struggle of Mustafa Kemal and his associates, with a hope that Sunni 
Ottoman totalitarianism would be overthrown at the end of the Turkish War of 
National Liberation. Mustafa Kemal was also well aware that the Alevi population 
was so influential and well organized that it was instructive to garner their support 
throughout the War of Liberation. He and his closest associates visited the 
Hacıbektaş Dervish Lodge on 23 December 1919 to discuss the course of the 
National struggle and ensure the support of this influential Alevi center both 
financially and politically before leaving.96 As part of this close cooperation, all 
developments regarding the National Struggle were immediately being conveyed to 
the center and to Çelebi Cemalettin Efendi, who was the head of the lodge. This 
communication network was clearly stated by Atatürk in his famous Nutuk as 
follows: “On 2 January 1920, we informed all central committees as well as Çelebi 
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 Cemalettin Efendi from Hacıbektaş and Hacı Musa Bey from Mutki.”97 Besides, 
Atatürk had numerous close associates, who were Alevis.98
Alevi community welcomed the proclamation of the Republic and the 
political and social reforms that ensued. Closure of religious schools and unification 
of education under the Ministry of Education, closure of Shari’ah courts and 
abolition of Shari’ah law, replacing Arabic script with Latin alphabet, abolition of 
Sheikh-ul-Islam and Caliphate in 1924 and establishment of a Republic in line with 
the principle of laicism were all appreciated by the Alevi community. These were the 
prizes for their staunch support to the National struggle; however they had to take the 
good with the bad. Republican period came with some drawbacks such as the 
establishment of Directorate of Religious Affairs and the ban on tekke and lodges.  
While Sunni population had the chance of going to mosques to worship, Alevi 
community had to secrete their religious rituals. Although the early republican period 
turned out to be a relatively tolerant period in terms of the policies adopted with 
regard to different religious beliefs and creeds, founders of the new Republic had the 
need to convert the ummah that was inherited from the Ottoman Empire, into a 
nation. To that, they chose to construct the new identity on the bases of Turkish 
identity and Sunni Islam, which also was used as social glue. Despite all these 
negative developments, majority of the Alevis identified with Kemalism.99 For 
example Alevis fought against the rebels during the first important Kurdish rebellion, 
Şeyh Sait rebellion in 1925. Although there had been minor uprisings of Kurdish 
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 Alevis in 1921(Koçgiri) and 1937-8(Dersim), Van Bruinessen concludes that 
Kurdish Alevis never cooperated with Sunni Kurds in significant numbers.100  
1960s and 1970s were decades that witnessed high levels of modernization, 
urbanization and political polarization. Alevi youth, who had been marginalized for 
so long stepped into the politics and aligned themselves with the radical left wing of 
the conflicting parties. Marxist ideologies started to command the Alevi youth. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Alevi was identified with Marxist; the untrimmed 
moustache, which was a symbol of secrecy within Alevi community, became the 
symbol of Marxist-orientation; their focus had shifted from the problems of Alevi 
community to the class struggles and a vision of a Marxist revolution.101 During the 
period, Alevis became natural allies with the radical left, whereas Sunni population 
was dragged to the extreme right camp. This led to the escalation of conflicts 
between Alevi and Sunni population and resulted in bloody clashes, such as the ones 
in Malatya, Çorum and Kahramanmaraş towards the end of 1970s.  
On the other hand, high degree of politicization among the Alevi youth did 
not bring Alevi politics to life; Alevi identity was replaced by a leftist-revolutionary 
identity. Many observers asserted that vanishing of Alevi identity was a matter of 
time.102 Even some political attempts to revitalize the Alevi identity turned out to be 
futile. The Union Party of Turkey was established in 1966, its votes had gradually 
decreased and it lost its political effectiveness totally after 1977.103
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 3.2.1  Aftermath of the 1980 Military Coup 
 
This modest posture of the Alevis came to an end after the 1980 military 
coup. As mentioned above, Alevis were ready to remain silent and support Kemalist 
Republic as long as state suppressed any kind of religious domination over politics. 
This equilibrium was wobbled by the 1980 military intervention and the policies that 
military junta pursued in its aftermath.  
Government-led Islamization policy, and the ascendancy of Islamic 
fundamentalism in society disturbed the Alevis. Since they had been an enemy of 
Islamic reactionism due to their negative memories of the Ottoman rule, they became 
politicized once more, but this time with a goal of voicing their demands as a 
community. Çamuroğlu contends that establishment of Alevi both in the fields of 
media and politics, and increasing awareness of an Alevi identity are outcomes of a 
“defensive instinct” of the Alevis against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, 
especially against the government-led promotion of Sunni creed.104 As Ahmad 
correctly observes, “there is no doubt that the influence of Islam in Turkish politics 
and society has increased dramatically under the military government.”105
1980 military junta came with the idea of “Turkish-Islamic” synthesis, 
which would serve as a means for countering revolutionary ideas that had garnered a 
significant level of support among the Turkish youth. Popular inclination towards 
radical left could be counter-balanced by pushing Islam to the forefront, which by 
and large had the same support potential as leftist ideologies had.  
So as to succeed in this goal, religious education that was to cover Sunni 
belief and rituals was made compulsory in high schools, Directorate of Religious 
Affairs was strengthened, and number of mosques built increased dramatically and 
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 Sunni prayer leaders had been appointed even to Alevi villages. This strategy 
persisted during the civilian governments that came to office after the 1980 coup. A 
few examples can be given to illustrate this continuity. In 1985, Arabic language was 
incorporated to Turkey’s high school curriculum as a foreign language; prayer rooms 
were built in the government offices and in the parliament; and in 1988, a law was 
enacted to ban making of offensive allegations about the prophet, Allah and Islam.106 
Table 1 shows the dramatic increase in personnel recruitment at the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs after the first civilian government after the 1980 coup came to 
power in 1983. All these measures that promoted Sunni Islam as the official Islam, 
stimulated public expression and revival of Alevi identity in the mid-1980s. 
Since then official policy towards the recognition of Aleviness has not 
changed. Directorate of Religious Affairs repeatedly declares that Aleviness is not a 
creed of Islam, it is merely a culture and a way of life within Islam and it even calls 
Alevi people to the mosques.107 Cemevleri, which are the worshipping places of 
 
TABLE 1  Personnel at the Department of Religious Affairs 
Year Supplementary 
Services 
Religious Services Management Services Total 
1979 1,035 47,744 1,977 50,756 
1980 1,239 49,831 2,202 53,272 
1981 1,239 49,831 2,202 53,272 
1982 1,239 49,831 2,202 53,272 
1983 1,239 50,130 2,202 53,571 
1984 1,549 55,890 3,581 61,020 
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 1985 1,549 55,890 3,581 61,020 
1986 1,639 61,696 3,682 67,017 
1987 1,739 67,166 4,120 73,025 
1988 1,864 77,725 4,673 84,262 
1989 1,976 77,722 4,944 84,642 
Source: The (Annual) Department of Religious Affairs Bulletin, Ankara, 1989, as quoted in Lapidot, 
“Islamic Activism,” p.71. 
 
Alevis have been regarded as cultural richness that is not comparable with 
mosques108 and some hardliners had considered Alevis as the second largest group of 
separatists after PKK.109
 
3.3 Role of the Military in Politics 
 
3.3.1 Stepping into the Political Scene 
 
Military’s presence has been of central importance in Turkish politics since 
the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and its demise that gave way to the 
emergence of modern Turkey. 1909 coup of Şevket Pasha established the reformist 
Young Turk rule and military officers of the perished Ottoman Empire orchestrated 
the War of National Liberation.110 Essential role of the military persisted during the 
early years of the resistance. Before 1924, there were significant numbers of serving 
army commanders, who also had seats in the Parliament; over 13 were deputies and 
some others were ambassadors or governors.111  
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 Atatürk himself strongly opposed military’s involvement in politics. 
Although Atatürk turned out to be the dominant figure and the founder of the Turkish 
Republic, the War of National Liberation was not a product of one man’s efforts, it 
was the collaboration of many groups and individuals. There emerged rifts within 
these groups after the war against Allied Powers was won, and inevitably these rifts 
led to profound struggles for power. In William Hale’s words, “the most serious 
challenge to Atatürk’s dominance came…from within the ranks of the political and 
military elite in Ankara.”112 Although Atatürk permit some of his close supporters 
within the military to hold posts in the Assembly throughout the War of National 
Liberation, later on he barred them from holding political posts and military ranks at 
the same time. The most important reason of his separating politics and the military 
was that he had strong rivals within the high-ranked military officers. Ali Fuat 
Cebesoy, Kazım Karabekir, Refet Bele and Cafer Eğilmez were challenging his 
dominance and their challenges were of major importance due to their military 
powers. Their opposition was so perilous that Atatürk appointed Kazım Karabekir 
and Ali Fuat Cebesoy to Anatolia, as army inspectors.113  
It did not take long for Atatürk to introduce legal measures for detaching 
military personnel from politics. On 19 December 1923, Grand National Assembly 
enacted a law that obliged officers and soldiers to resign from the army before their 
election as deputies. This law also stated that the corps commanders who were 
currently members of the parliament could not take part in the discussions, unless 
they resigned their commands. Finally Article 40 of the referred law rendered the 
Grand National Assembly responsible for the command of the armed forces. Thus 
Turkish army was placed under control of civilian authorities by this law. In 3 March 
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 1924, the Chief of General Staff was made responsible to the President, and its seat 
in the cabinet was foregone. Later, Article 148 of the Military Penal Code 
consolidated these principles by barring military personnel from joining political 
parties, holding or participating political meetings, giving political speeches in public 
or prepare, sign or send to the press any declaration of a political character.  
Apart from the strong opposition by some generals to Atatürk, another 
reason for adopting such measures was Atatürk’s belief that participation in politics 
would downgrade military personnel’s performance. He contends that 
commanders, while thinking of and carrying out the duties and 
requirements of the army, must take care not to let political 
considerations influence their judgment. They must not forget 
that there are other officials whose duty is to think of the political 
aspects. A soldiers’ duty cannot be performed with talk and 
politicking.114
 
However, there had been some declarations of Atatürk that causes 
confusion regarding his opinion on the role of the military. An illustrative 
example is his speech delivered at the Army Club in Konya in 1931. In this 
speech he encourages young army officers to be the guardians of the 
Republic: 
You know that whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to 
stride towards the heights it has always seen its army, 
which is composed of its own heroic sons, as the permanent 
leader in the forefront of this march, as the permanent 
vanguard in campaigns to bring lofty national ideas to 
reality…In times to come, also, its heroic soldier sons will 
march in the vanguard for the attainment of the sublime 
ideals of the Turkish nation.115    
 
Another example is the Article 34 of the Army Internal Service 
Law, which reads as “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend 
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 the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic, as determined in the 
Constitution.”116  
Despite this ambiguity, thanks to the dominant character of Atatürk, 
moderate outlook of Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak to politics and İsmet 
İnönü, who stuck with Atatürk’s ideal of a ‘professional military’, army stood aloof 
from politics until the first military takeover in 1960. Supreme War Council only had 
advisory powers and defense budget fell down sharply due to economic hardships. 
Yet, upper echelons of the military were sensitive towards the proposal to make the 
Chief of the General Staff responsible to the Minister of Defense instead of the 
President but a consensus was reached and the Chief of the General Staff was made 
responsible to the Prime Minister in 1944.117 This incident is illustrative of the 
army’s posture regarding its position vis-à-vis the political institutions; they neither 
wanted to rule them nor to get less than they deserved.  
This reasoning changed in the 1950s. DP came to power in 1950 by 
offering lavish subsidies and incentives to the agricultural sector and garnered most 
of its votes from the wealthy agriculturalists. The mid-1950s were characterized with 
high inflation rates and low salaries in the public sector that “diminished the prestige 
and influence of the military-civilian bureaucracy.”118 This inevitably caused 
resentment among the military ranks. However, this resentment could not be the only 
motive for the military officers to take over, as Szyliowicz argues. Szyliowicz asserts 
that military officers had gone through in the military an intense socialization 
program that changed their values and attitudes and imposed Kemalist behaviors 
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 instead of earthly concerns of money.119 Thus, this resentment culminated in a 
military coup when it was coupled with DP’s growing authoritarianism such as its 
threats of closing RPP, and its increasing reference to religion by means of restoring 
the call to prayer in Arabic, allowing the burgeoning of tarikats and building 15.000 
new mosques120 paved the way to the 1960 coup. 
After the coup, no junta was installed; instead, coup-makers chose to give 
most of the positions to the RPP, while reserving some of the important positions to 
military personnel, basically “by the fall of 1960 the government was virtually in the 
hands of the RPP once more.”121 Coup-makers were quick to return government to 
civilians, therefore elections were held in 1961 after the Constitution was prepared. 
The 1961 Constitution can be considered as a relatively liberal constitution, which 
recognized existence of labor rights, championed free enterprise and political 
freedom. However, it also created the National Security Council that was to leave its 
imprint on Turkish politics since then. 
Some exit guarantees employed by the makers of the 1960 coup (National 
Unity Committee-NUC) aimed at consolidating military oversight in politics. First 
one is the establishment of National Security Council whose powers were designed 
by Article 111 of the Constitution. The Council was to include ministers whose 
number was going to be determined by law as well as the representatives of the 
forces. The Council was to have the power to submit its views to the Council of 
Ministers to assist it in the decision-making process. Besides, article 70 of the 
Constitution made ruling members of NUC lifetime members of the Senate.122  
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 Before the 1960 coup, there were some cleavages among the military 
officers with regard to the shape of the coming coup. Some junior officers were 
championing a prolonged military rule, whereas senior officers were in favor of 
‘cleaning up the mess’ and stepping down. As the intervention was pursued in the 
way senior officers wanted it to be, radicals were sacked from the NUC and sent 
abroad on diplomatic duties. One of those 15 officers was Alparslan Türkeş who 
came back to Turkey in 1963 and joined the Republican Peasants’ Nation Party, 
which was renamed as the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in 1965. This party and 
later on the NAP turned out to be the umbrella party for the right extremists while 
Marxism was spreading quickly among the universities and trade unions.  
Bloody conflicts between these two camps exemplified the late 1960s. 
Parties represented in the Parliament increased to eight, leading to the paralysis of 
legislation. Thus, the military stepped in once again, this time through the National 
Security Council, in March 1971. Commanders called the incumbent administration 
to an understanding above party politics and they warned that the military could fully 
intervene unless necessary measures were taken to prevent disorder.123 In response, 
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel immediately resigned from his post and a 
military-backed government was formed under the leadership of Nihat Erim. 
The 1971 intervention enhanced the role of the military in politics by 
making an amendment in Article 111 of 1961 Constitution that drew the borders of 
National Security Council. The word ‘submits’ was replaced by ‘recommends’ and 
‘force representatives’ by ‘force commanders’, which strengthened the legal and 
political footing of the institution. Alongside these amendments, Armed Forces were 
exempted from the audition by the Court of Accounts (Article 127) and the scope of 
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 functions and the powers of the military courts was extended.124 Finally the State 
Security Courts were established for trying cases related to the security of the state. 
 
3.3.2 The 1980 Coup 
 
Out of the same atmosphere that led to the 1971 intervention came the 1982 
coup. Political and economic breakdown, frequent challenges against secularism 
disturbed the military officers. Basic polarization forces were the NAP, National 
Salvation Party (NSP) and small communist groups. The coup was triggered by the 
mass rally of NSP at Konya, in which majority of attendants refused to stand up 
while the national anthem was played.125  
This coup was considerably different from the previous ones. First of all, 
this time the military was not accompanied by the RPP. Organic link between the 
RPP and the military had severed in the aftermath of the 1971 coup by memorandum. 
Ecevit became the chairman of the RPP in 1972 after the death of İnönü, and the path 
that the party had been following changed. Major divergences occurred in the policy 
positions of the party and the military, especially regarding the conception of nation 
and “the idea that Turkey was a national state.”126 Thus, this time military did not 
enjoy the support of a political party. 
The 1980 coup went further in reinforcing military’s position in politics. 
First amendment was done on the beloved playground of consecutive military juntas, 
on the article that regulates functions and the establishment of National Security 
Council. Article 118 of the Constitution enlisted the civilian members of the Council 
instead of leaving their determination to the law. In this fashion “numerical equality 
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 of military and nonmilitary members was assured.”127 Civilian members of the NSC 
were the President, Prime Minister, and the ministers of National Defense, Interior, 
and Foreign Affairs. Other than this, the Council of Ministers was obliged to take 
into consideration ‘with priority’ the recommendations of NSC. Another law 
equipped the military with an invaluable tool to be utilized to legitimize its active 
role: the Law on the National Security Council (Law 2945) made a broad definition 
of national security and its components. According to the law national security 
included protection of the constitutional order, state’s political, social, cultural, 
economic interests in the international arena, and the nation’s integrity.128  
The Law on the State of Emergency (Law 1402) was amended in 1980 so 
as to grant a sort of immunity to martial law commanders; no judicial appeals were to 
be made by civilian courts against acts of martial law commanders. This law also 
extended the scope of functions and powers of the martial law courts by permitting 
their trial of crimes outside the martial law regions, in case they are related to a crime 
committed within the borders of a martial law area. This law reveals the profound 
differences of opinion between the military and Prime Minister Ecevit, since was 
regarded as a response to Ecevit’s introduction of coordination principle that had 
required government approval of martial law authority’s decisions. 
Election of General Kenan Evren as President during the Constitutional 
referendum was also a peculiar case. A ‘Yes’ vote cast for the Constitution meant a 
‘Yes’ vote cast for Evren’s Presidency. Turkish people, who were tired of bloodshed 
inevitably cast their votes in favor of the new Constitution; and by design in favor of 
General Evren’s Presidency.  
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 Among the most authoritarian practices of 1980 junta were its 
establishment of the High Board of Supervision, and the Higher Education Council. 
The High Board of Supervision was a body designed for supervising public entities, 
especially to keep an eye on civil bureaucrats’ ideological affiliations.129 The Higher 
Education Council was created so as to regulate appointments, promotions and daily 
work in the universities. These two institutions symbolized firm grip of the military 
in political and social life.  
The 1982 Constitution also banned former politicians’ political activities 
for ten years. Although this ban was repealed in 1987, its mention is instructive as to 
show the extent of military authoritarianism that persisted during the military rule of 
1980-83.  
In 1983, Özal government came to office and a division of labor emerged 
effortlessly; Evren was active in defense and foreign policy areas whereas Özal was 
more involved in economic policy-making.130  When Evren’s term as the President 
ended, Özal was elected as President in 1989. Özal had a distinctive way of 
governance, and this led to disputes between him and the military. These disputes 
came to surface after Turkey’s participation to the Gulf War, which Özal saw as an 
opportunity to ally Turkey with Western countries, and to have a say in the post Cold 
War designs of the world.131  Consequently, the Chief of General Staff Necip 
Torumtay, who was opposed to Turkey’s participation to the War, resigned. Many 
analysts assessed this event as a key event on the way of civilianization of Turkish 
politics. Hale and many others argued that before, when a Chief of Staff opposed to a 
government policy, he would have orchestrated a coup; but now a Chief was 
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 resigning due to a dispute over security policy, which falls under the specialization of 
military.132  
However these analyses were mere wishful thinking, as it turned out when 
the Welfare Party (WP) came to office as member of the coalition in 28 June 1996. 
Initial reaction of the military was to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. However 
mounting reports declaring that WP was after taking Turkey back to Shari’a order 
and WP’s relentless efforts to recruit its supporters to state institutions as well as the 
dramatic increase in the Prayer Leader and Preacher School graduates and illegal 
Koran courses alarmed the NSC.133 The dinner reception that Erbakan gave to the 
leaders of religious orders “was the last milestone in the unfolding of the…political 
crisis in Turkey.”134 After many attempts of President Demirel, at the 28 February 
1997 meeting of the NSC resolutions, the issue was addressed harshly and on 26 
May 1997 Supreme Military Council dismissed a number of military officers 
allegedly had been sympathizing with Political Islam. This confrontation between the 
military and Erbakan ended on 18 June 1997, when Erbakan resigned and President 
Demirel gave the duty of forming a new government to Mesut Yılmaz, leader of the 
Motherland Party.  
 
3.4 Limitations on Sovereignty 
 
Foreign policy of national struggle period was personally conducted by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In every occasion, he resisted offers of British or US 
mandate coming from every segment of the society, and from the ranks of the 
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 Anatolia and Rumeli Defense of Rights Organization that was the engine of national 
struggle. Basic pillars of this period’s foreign policy were delineated in Erzurum 
Congress (23 July 1919) and Sivas Congress (4 September 1919), as resistance 
against capitulations, partition and offers of mandate.  
Following years were also highly influenced by the memories of wartime 
and secret dismemberment agreements made by the Allied powers. Vali summarizes 
the fundamental national goals of modern Turkey’s foreign policy as follows: 
Because of her exposed geographical location, past historical 
experiences, and cultural ‘isolation,’ she [Turkey] is more conscious 
of independence than most other nations—that is more sensitive to 
any real or implied encroachment on her sovereignty.135
 
Foreign policy of the early Republican period was steered by the principles 
of “friendship with every nation”, “peace at home, peace at abroad” and “Turkey has 
no perpetual enemies”.136 However there was another component of early Republican 
foreign policy, which was westernization “in spite of the west.”137 Atatürk and his 
followers believed that there was only one civilization, which was the Western one, 
and they were fervently struggling for endorsement of Turkey as part of the Western 
civilization.  
Turkey’s policy during the early years of Republic was characterized by the 
quest of independence and sovereignty while committed to Western civilization. This 
goal of Westernization and European acculturation brought about a bias towards 
Western organizations despite all hurdles that needed to be overcome. This bias 
turned into a deep commitment to Western organizations after the Second World 
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 War, as the Soviet threats on Turkey threw it into a milieu of insecurity due to the 
Soviet threat on the East. 
 
3.4.1 The Lausanne Peace Treaty 
 
Glorious victory of Turkish national struggle was concluded by signing of 
the Lausanne Peace Treaty on 24 July 1923.  During the preliminary session of the 
Conference. İsmet İnönü delivered a speech, which underlined Turkish side’s request 
of recognition as an independent and sovereign state that was entitled to the same 
rights and privileges as other parties were.138 The thorniest issue turned out to be the 
issue of capitulations, which Allied powers eagerly asked continuation of and the 
Turkish delegation had been resisting since the beginning of the national struggle. 
Turkish delegation won over the capitulations issue and capitulations were abolished. 
Other achievements of the Treaty can be pinpointed as settlement of the issue of 
reparation claims of Turkey against Greece, temporary settlement of the Straits 
question, and realization of the borders envisaged by the National Pact with the 
exception of Mosul. However, there were some outstanding issues that were to have 
great deal of significance in the following years, such as the Mosul question, 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey, and the Ottoman debts.  
The significance of the Lausanne Treaty in the context of Atatürk’s outlook 
towards pooling sovereignty lies in its provisions concerning the Straits and 
economic policy. On the one hand the treaty gave Turkey full sovereignty over its 
territory; on the other hand it partially curbed Turkey’s sovereignty over the Straits 
and economic policy. Although capitulations were annulled, Lausanne set some 
restrictions on the new Republic’s economic policies, such as extension of existing 
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 tariff rates for five years.139 Similarly, the Straits question was resolved by 
internationalizing and demilitarizing the Straits. Straits were to be administered by an 
international commission, chaired by a Turkish citizen. The said commission was 
going to be under the Leagues of Nations mandate, and in case these terms were 
violated, Britain, France, Italy and Japan had the right to take action under League of 
Nations mandate.140
Thus, it can safely be argued that Mustafa Kemal and his close associate 
İsmet İnönü, who was also the head of the Turkish delegation to Lausanne, limited 
Turkey’s sovereignty over some issues, for the sake of ensuring the new state’s 
sovereignty in a broader sense.  
 
3.4.2 Entrance to the League of Nations 
 
During the Lausanne Peace Conference, there were two major outstanding 
problems – namely the exchange of minorities and the Mosul question. Final 
decision on them could not be made, a joint commission was set up for the resolution 
of minority exchange issue, of which members were to be appointed by the League 
of Nations; and the Mosul question became so deadlocked that its settlement was 
postponed to the following months. However, the Turkish delegation’s suspicions 
over the impartiality of this organization started coming to surface as early as the 
first remark of solving the minority dispute within the League of Nations machinery. 
The Turkish delegate İsmet İnönü declared that “since Turkey was not a member of 
the League, it would be inappropriate at that stage to consider using the League 
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 machinery.”141  Despite Turkey’s relentless objections, the issue was decided to be 
settled by the League of Nations, but Turkish delegate and public opinion had ever-
growing suspicions that the League was just a tool of the Allied Powers, especially 
Britain’s.142  
 These suspicions over impartiality of the League were rejuvenated by the 
Mosul question. The Mosul question was a sensitive issue that could not be resolved 
in Lausanne but it was decided to be taken before the League of Nations, if Britain 
and Turkey could not settle it by bilateral talks within the nine months following 
Lausanne. Moving through this decision taken in the Lausanne Treaty, the Mosul 
question was referred to the League of Nations after nine months of failure to resolve 
the issue. However there was an important clash between Turkey and the League 
concerning the binding power of the final decision taken by the League. Turkey 
argued that it was primarily a political problem that could not be resolved through 
legal mechanisms, whereas the League argued that the Lausanne Treaty referred to 
the League as the final resort in case a resolution was not reached between Britain 
and Turkey. This clash led to Turkey’s withdrawal of its representative from the 
negotiations. Thus, the League reached a settlement in 16 December 1925  in a 
session while Turkish representative was absent and decided to give Mosul to Iraq.143  
At that point, everybody was curious about Turkey’s reaction to the 
proposed arrangement, which was drawn without Turkey’s consent, and even its 
attendance. Striking was Turkey’s concurrence with the proposal to draw borders 
roughly in a way that the British would have suggested. The basic reason behind this 
was its fatigue due to long years of wars.  
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 This brief account of how Mosul question was settled is instructive as to 
understand the extent of Turkish suspicion of and resentment for the League. It is 
striking that after this course of events Turkey decided to join the League of Nations 
in 1932. Several reasons behind this decision can be identified, despite all these bitter 
relations. Turkey had started to adopt a policy of “collective security” by the end of 
1920s and the rise of the Nazis and aggravating economic and political problems in 
Europe produced a feeling of insecurity among the elites.144 Another reason was its 
policy of not being left out of an international organization that had the potential of 
giving a new direction to world politics. And final reason was Atatürk’s and Turkish 
elites’ unwavering drive of Westernization. By joining the League of Nations Turkey 
had for the first time broke off with its isolationist policy and aligned itself with the 
Western powers. 
The 1930s were the years of fascist aggression and troubled relations in 
world politics. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin were bluntly supporting – both militarily 
and politically -- opposing parties of the Spanish civil war, and tension was further 
escalated after Italians sank a Spanish ship in Turkish territorial sea in 1937. In 
response, a conference was convened with participation of the Mediterranean states 
for ending the existing state of insecurity in the Mediterranean. In that conference the 
Turkish delegation, which was acting in accordance with Atatürk’s instructions, 
permitted French and British ships’ use of Turkish naval bases in their fight with 
Italian aggression.145 This permit was a clear reflection of Turkey’s growing belief in 
collective security; since 1932 Italy had been fortifying the Dodecanese Islands that 
were too close to the Anatolian mainland and this aggravated Turkey’s feeling of 
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 insecurity in a conflictual environment and pushed it to seek alliances that could 
counterbalance the Italian threat. 
Then came the Second World War that turned out to be a major challenge 
to Turkish policy makers. Turkey adopted a neutrality policy, which it successfully 
pursued owing to “diplomatic rope-dancing”146 and luck. Despite belligerent parties’ 
efforts of inducing Turkey to war, Turkey remained neutral and it waged war against 
Germany only three months (23 February 1945) before the end of the World War II, 
so as to get acceptance to San Francisco Conference as an original member. 
The end of the World War II, and approaching Cold War incited 
establishment of security alliances and political organizations, of which the most 
important ones were the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Increasing threats in a war torn continent triggered both 
military and political cooperation among the European states, and Turkey wanted to 
have a part in these structures, due to its commitment to Westernization, economic 
problems and perception of insecurity. Particularly Turkey’s bid in NATO 
membership is illustrative of these motives. After the war came to an end, the Soviet 
Union increased its threatening demands from Turkey; it asked for a revision on the 
Montreux Convention of 1936 that had given Turkey full sovereignty over the 
Straits. Soviet Union was pushing for joint defense of Straits, which Turkey was 
opposing vehemently. Aside of this security motive, Turkey was concerned should 
US extend aid to NATO members; it would reduce its aid extended to Turkey. Final 
motive was the ultimate goal of westernization. In Karaosmanoğlu’s words, 
“Turkey’s decisiveness in joining NATO derived mostly from a profound belief in 
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 Western values and in the virtues of Western political systems.”147 Thus, it applied 
for NATO membership in May 1950, but its application was turned down.  
The objections raised against Turkey’s NATO membership were similar to 
those put forth by the EU today. Its insecure neighborhood, its geographical location 
that did not qualify for being ‘Atlantic’, and its predominantly Muslim population 
were the most common grounds of objection, and similarly Turkey was being offered 
alternative forms of ‘special relationship’ models such as associate membership.148 In 
such an environment the Korean War, which later turned out to be the key that set the 
ball rolling for Turkey’s NATO membership, broke out. This was an opportunity 
beyond compare for Turkey to display its commitment to virtues of collective 
security. Turkey took advantage of this opportunity and sent a mixed brigade of 
4,500 men, which was the third largest after the US and South Korean forces.149 But 
sending troops to Korea was not all that it took to join NATO; President Bayar’s 
threat to “reappraise Turkey’s orientation in the Cold War”150 if Turkey was not 
admitted to NATO was also a key factor to induce US and European allies of NATO 
to let Turkey in.  
After its accession to the organization, Turkey had contributed to the 
alliance as much as it could. 15 divisions of Turkish Armed Forces was assigned to 
NATO, 29 bases were accessible to NATO during the Cold War. But the most 
controversial contribution was bilateral treaties that were signed between Turkey and 
the US. The Agreement between Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the 
Status of Their Forces, signed on 19 June 1951, granted parties the right to establish 
facilities, deploy contingents and to subject them to their domestic law. In line with 
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 this agreement the US made 54 bilateral agreements that were concluded without 
getting parliamentary consent.151  These agreements confined Turkish authorities’ 
sovereignty in certain areas, since they went as far as envisaging establishment of 
special postal services, special tribunals that were subject to US law, and duty free 
shops for the US contingents deployed on Turkish soil.  
 
3.4.3  Limitations on Sovereignty due to the relations with the EU 
 
By and large, the most important arena for discussing Turkey’s ability 
and/or willing to partially surrender its sovereignty is Turkey’s long-lasting relations 
with the EU. Basic turning points in Turkey-EU relations in the context of limiting 
sovereignty are the Ankara (Association) Agreement, Customs Union Agreement 
and application in 1987 for full membership. 
Turkey’s application to the EEC came as of 1959, right after the Greek 
application.  Main motive behind the application was westernization per se, since the 
Turkish government was seeking to align itself with the West and prevent Greece 
from having an upper hand in West European organizations; and the application 
resulted in the conclusion of an Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) in 1963 
between the EEC and Turkey. What is striking in this agreement is Turkey’s 
insistence on an agreement more than a free trade agreement that makes reference to 
a future Customs Union as well as political commitments. Turkish government 
wanted to make sure that the EEC puts the prospect of full membership at the end of 
the tunnel.  
Again, so as to compel the EU for admitting Turkey to membership, the 
Turkish government, a coalition of the True Path Party (TPP) and the RPP, joined the 
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 Customs Union in December 1995. This way, Turkey became the only state to have a 
Customs Union with the EU without being a full member. Turkey, through the 
Customs Union agreement, surrendered its sovereign rights in foreign trade policies. 
By joining the customs union, Turkey was obliged to comply with the European 
Union’s common tariff rates and to align its competition and taxation policies with 
the EU law. This was a great deal of sovereignty relegated in order to support the 
country’s bid for the EU accession, as a full member.   
This analysis of the evolution of key issues raised by the EU conditionality, 
namely the Kurdish question, the Alevi question, the role of the military in politics 
and limitations on sovereignty. The primary goal of this chapter was to reveal the 
rupture from Atatürkist practices after the 1980 military coup concerning the Kurdish 
question, the Alevi question and the role of the military. The last section of the 
chapter gave an account of how limitations on sovereignty had been handled prior to 
Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country, since one of the most common 
assertions of the orthodox Kemalists after Turkey’s recognition as a candidate 
country is that limitations on national sovereignty in policy making and consequently 
Turkey’s EU membership are unacceptable. The following chapter will analyze in 
further detail the orthodox views regarding the limitations of sovereignty as well as 
other key areas that cause conflict between the EU’ requirements and the orthodox 
interpretation of Kemalism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ORTHODOX AND NEO-KEMALIST VIEWS 
 
 
Although “the history of the times shows how slow and hard social, 
scientific, and ideological changes are,”152 Edward Shils identifies endogenous and 
exogenous sources of changes in ideologies.  Ideologies change because of 
intellectual sources such as the intellectual efforts of its adherents to clarify the 
inconsistencies or filling the gaps in it, and exogenous sources such as the pressure of 
external reality.153 Shils argues that: 
the world does not easily accommodate itself to the requirements of 
ideologies. The facts of life do not fit their categories; those who live 
their lives among these facts do not yield to the exhortations and 
offenses of the ideologists…Despite resistance, the ideology is 
retouched, at first superficially, later more deeply.154
 
The first type of efforts were observed during the first years of the republic as early 
as the 1930s, while three major groups were after dominating Kemalism and Turkish 
political life: ‘Conservative Kemalists’, ‘Kadrocu Kemalists’ and ‘Re-constructivist 
Kemalists’. The Conservatives were modernist in politics and conservative on 
cultural matters. They advocated that religion should be separated from state affairs 
but that it could not be detached from the social life and the national identity since it 
was a part of the Turkish culture. And they believed that culture should not be 
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 questioned in the light of modernist assumptions, because culture was a matter of 
historical continuity and an outcome of the cumulative experiences of a society; and 
it was the primary social cement. On the other hand, the re-constructivists had the 
goal of reshaping the society in line with the secularist ideals. They wanted to erase 
all kinds of morality based on religion and they tried to create a classless society 
based on secular morality. They believed that people should be inculcated with 
revolutionary secular ideas in order to reach efficient democratic governance. They 
contended that the people should be matured and inculcated spiritually before 
governing the country. Thus, the re-constructivists shoulder the responsibility of 
educating and reshaping the people in accordance with the revolutionary values. To 
this end they even utilized religious language while referring to revolutionary issues. 
They called the People’s Houses as the “Temples of Ideal” and Atatürk`s Nutuk was 
considered as the “Holy Book.”155 The Kadrocu Kemalists were dedicated to 
constructing an ideology for the unfinished Turkish revolution.  They regarded 
democracy, liberalism and individualism as harmful to the development of the 
society. Unlike the re-constructivists, who sympathized the French Revolution and 
its Jacobin nature, the Kadrocus were degrading European values including the 
concepts introduced by the French Revolution. They wanted to have a classless 
society just like the re-constructivists and they regarded classical democracy as a 
threat for this classless society. Thus, they advocated an authoritarian rule delivered 
by the hands of a single-party instead of a multi-party regime.156 Although the 
Kadrocu Kemalists were focused on their opinions on economy and politics, it can be 
                                                          
155 Ertan Aydın, The Peculiarities Of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology In 
The 1930s: The Ülkü Version Of Kemalism, 1933-1936, Ph.D. dissertation (Ankara: Bilkent 
University, 2003), 9-15. 
156 Temuçin Faik Ertan, Kadrocular ve Kadro Hareketi (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 
1994) 117-32. 
 65
 said that they were seeking a cultural identity different than the Ottoman identity and 
they sympathized the Central Asian culture.157  
However these attempts were relatively weak and they were attempts from 
within the Kemalist circles without having an external anchor for this revision 
project. Today Shils’ second source of ideological change is on the scene; change 
borne by the EU conditionality. Those who live by the principle of civilizationism 
regard the EU membership as a one-way route. However the EU membership does 
not get along well with the prevalent Orthodox interpretation of Kemalism. 
Consequently there emerged a pressure from the society for rethinking the Orthodox 
interpretation of Kemalism. The EU candidacy became a proper external anchor and 
due to this positive signal, a notable public support emerged in favor of the EU 
membership. As İlter Turan posits,  
external support for change in a society is effective if such change 
is desired by significant segments of the domestic population and 
the external actors appear not to impose but to appreciate and 
reward change.158
 
Therefore, a pressure for revision of the ideology is imposed on the 
ideologists of Orthodox Kemalism. This pressure to recalibrate Kemalism is growing 
everyday due to the EU conditionality, which seriously penetrates into the red lines 
of orthodox Kemalist ideology.  This chapter makes an overview of the Orthodox 
and neo-Kemalist views on sensitive issues of Kemalism that have been touched by 
the EU conditionality, such as the Kurdish question, the Alevi question, the role of 
the military and the EU membership in general. 
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4.1 Orthodox Kemalists 
 
This group is the beholder of the widely accepted interpretation of 
Kemalism that has been dominating Turkey’s political scene particularly since the 
1950s. Turkish military’s views are highly representative of this group’s basic 
interpretations. Following analysis of the military’s attitudes towards some 
controversial elements of the EU conditionality is based on high-ranking military 
officials’ declarations on various issues. Homogeneity of military education, isolated 
work conditions and the military discipline of high-ranking officials give us an 
opportunity to presume their representation of the military as a whole. 
Contrary to the common wisdom, although military has always been 
attached to the Kemalist reforms, initially it had not ideologized and defended 
Kemalism under Atatürk (1923-1938) and İnönü (1938-1950) as vigorously as it did 
after the full transition to multi-party politics in 1946. Military schools started to 
place emphasis on teaching Kemalism as an ideology only after the military got 
restless over the ideological fragmentation of Turkish society within a pluralistic 
political framework. Turkish military was initially disturbed by the DP’s references 
to religion in the 1950s and the persistence of religious movements afterwards; as 
well as the leftist movements that stroke Turkish politics throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. These ideological concerns led military schools to increase the number of 
courses devoted to Kemalism, and pushed the 1980 military junta to present and 
disseminate Kemalism as the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic. A 
prominent journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, observes that while Kemalism had not been 
elaborated in the military academies during the 1940s, in the 1960s the number of 
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 hours dedicated to instruction in Kemalism rose from 5 to 8-9 percent.159 Military 
utilized Kemalism for preserving the status quo, and for preventing the spread of 
political extremism among the society. Especially after the 1980 military coup, a 
“conservative” version of Kemalism was seen as the cure for the social upheavals. 
This conservative interpretation, or this orthodox interpretation, showed 
itself in every aspect of Turkey-EU relations, but particularly in sensitive issues that 
are interlinked with Kemalism. Initial response of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) 
to the demands of the EU demands was harsh. The first draft of “The Measures that 
Turkey Needs to Take in the Light of the Copenhagen Political Criteria” report 
prepared by the Prime Ministry High Council for the Coordination of Human Rights 
Issues [Başbakanlık İnsan Hakları Koordinatör Üst Kurulu] in May 2000, which 
involved groundbreaking proposals such as abolishing the ban on use of languages 
other than Turkish in expression of thoughts and inclusion of ‘constitutional 
citizenship’ article to the Constitution, was harshly criticized by the NSC. In 
response to this report, also known as the ‘Demirok report’, the NSC issued another 
report, which argued that permitting broadcasting in Kurdish and teaching Kurdish 
would facilitate separatist movements and threaten Turkey’s national unity. Another 
striking assessment that the NSC did was that it would not be proper to comply with 
the Union’s exaggerated demands that are incompatible with Turkey’s 
peculiarities.160 After the NSC report, the Demirok report was smoothened by 
excluding the abovementioned controversial elements and Gürsel Demirok who was 
the architect of the report was withdrawn from his post. The Domestic Security 
Report issued by the Office of the Chief of General Staff in December 2000 also 
included notable reservations regarding broadcasting in and teaching of Kurdish. 
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 After stating that during the past years some EU member states had supported PKK, 
the report went on to claim that the terrorist organization was exploiting the EU’s 
demands such as recognition of sub-identities, broadcasting in Kurdish and teaching 
of Kurdish.161  
This view persisted throughout the upper echelons of the TAF in the 
following years. In 2001, brigadier general Halil Şimşek—the then Commander of 
the Armed Forces Academy—expressed his concerns about the EU membership by 
saying that through the Accession Partnership, the Union was trying to divide Turkey 
by pushing Turkey to grant cultural rights, right to broadcast in and teaching Kurdish 
to its Kurdish originated citizens, who are the constituent elements of Turkey.162  
Similarly, one year later another high ranking military officer Tuncer Kılınç, the then 
Secretary-General of the National Security Council put his anti-EU views. After 
stating that he was expressing his personal views, not the official view of the TAF, 
he argued that Turkey should seek alliances with Russia, Iran and the US instead of 
the EU membership.163 Although Kılınç highlighted that these were his personal 
views, declarations of an officer of his rank are bound to be treated at least as widely 
approved opinions in the upper echelons of the TAF. 
Prioritization of nationalism and the concept of national unity can be traced 
in almost all declarations of high-ranking military officials. For orthodox Kemalists 
some international institutions and some European countries want Turkey to give up 
the unitary structure of the Republic and the nation-statehood by utilizing the 
pretense of cultural rights and freedoms, human rights and democracy. In a similar 
vein, members of this group regard recognition of Alevis as a religious community as 
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 a threat to the unitary nature of Turkey. Military commanders even refrain from 
mentioning the possibility of recognizing ethnic and sectarian minorities, and they 
remind that the existence of ethnic and religious differences does not necessarily 
constitute minorities; minority rights are individual rights and cannot be politicized 
by regarding them as collective rights. The then Commander of the Land Forces 
Atilla Ateş argues that some institutions are trying to introduce Alevi-Sunni 
distinction to a people who have been living together since thousands of years.164 
Directorate of Religious Affairs repeatedly declares that Aleviness is not a sect of 
Islam, it is merely a culture and a way of life within Islam and it calls Alevi people to 
the mosques. The same denial policy applied in the Kurdish issue prevails in the 
Aleviness issue, and orthodox Kemalists try to silence discussions in this issue.  
They regard the TAF as the only institution that is capable of preserving the 
national unity of Turkey and as the only institution that ‘divisive’ forces cannot 
penetrate into. A speech delivered in August 2004 by the Second Chief of General 
Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt well explains the high-ranking military officers’ view 
regarding the role of the military in Turkish politics:  
We observe that some internal and external powers try to 
marginalize the TAF from its regime guardianship role by making 
general statements like ‘the role of the military in Turkish politics’. 
No one should doubt that we would keep on shouldering our 
responsibilities regardless of individual concerns.165  
 
This ‘promise’ to carry on their responsibilities is the essence of the EU’s concerns 
regarding the role of the military. Yet, the TAF show no sign of compromise when it 
comes to their guardianship role in Turkish politics. 
Yet, there have been some recent declarations of top military officers such 
as the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök and Second Chief of General Staff Yaşar 
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 Büyükanıt, which seem to be groundbreaking in terms of their pro-EU views and 
courage of recalibrating Kemalism. Yaşar Büyükanıt argues that Turkey’s EU 
membership is a natural outcome of Atatürk’s ideal of civilizationism and that the 
TAF give full support to the EU ideal. He also argues that Kemalism should not be 
seen as a dogma. He says that Atatürk did not leave behind a narrow ideological 
framework; what he left behind is a humanist, modern, innovationist worldview.166 
Likewise, Hilmi Özkök occasionally delivered similar speeches that underscore the 
TAF’s support for the EU membership, and he even openly criticized the military 
coups in Turkey and promised that from now on the military would increase its trust 
to civilian decisions.167  
However when analyzed in depth it can be observed that these declarations 
represent almost the same old mentality; but disguised with a pro-EU rhetoric. The 
external and internal pressures demanding a transformation of Turkish political 
system, coupled with the high levels of popular support for Turkey’s EU membership 
urged the military to pay lip service to Turkey’s EU membership.  But it is still the 
old wine in a new bottle. This artificial attitude displays itself especially with regard 
to the ethnic and sectarian minority issues. A speech delivered by the then Second 
Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt on 30 May 2003 is very illustrative in terms 
of revealing the ambivalent position of the military. After underscoring that the 
military could never be against the EU membership, he went on to argue that the 
right to broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was threatening due to the 
existence of thousands of terrorists within the country.  
Therefore it can be safely argued that the TAF pay lip service to Turkey’s 
EU membership by claiming to be pro-EU in rhetoric but remaining skeptical of the 
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 EU’s sincerity and rejecting its conditionality particularly regarding the issue of 
ethnic and sectarian minorities, the role of the military in politics and in general, 
further democratization of Turkish politics through enhanced individual rights and 
freedoms that would bring about a more plural society. High level of popular support 
for Turkey’s EU membership pushes the military to pay lip service to the EU 
membership but by the ‘Ankara criteria’ instead of the ‘Copenhagen criteria.’ Thus 
the TAF preserves its mission of keeping an eye on political developments, but at the 
same time pretends to be pro-EU and open minded with regard to the roadmap drawn 
by the EU for Turkey’s full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Each and 
every declaration delivered by high-ranking military officers pays tribute to 
democracy, the EU membership, diversity; but still ends up with the promise to 
‘protect the Turkish Republic and democracy from internal threats’, which 
constitutes the crux of the problem with regard to the civil-military relations in 
Turkey.  
TAF’s genuine feelings with regard to the EU conditionality and the EU 
membership in general can easily be observed in the declarations of retired high 
ranking military officers. For example former Second Chief of the General Staff 
Çevik Bir offers consideration of the ‘Shanghai Five’ as an alternative to the EU 
membership.168 Similarly, retired general Suat İlhan expresses his views regarding 
the EU membership as follows: 
Those principles [The six arrows] that constitute the source of 
Kemalism and Kemalist system of thought will be distorted and 
weakened in case of Turkey’s EU membership. Sharing with the EU 
institutions the principles of independence and national sovereignty 
that Atatürk infused into the cement of Turkish republic and nation, 
would deprive our country from these superior qualities and would 
render Turkey a [federal] state of the EU…It is impossible to support 
the EU membership without denying the validity of Kemalist 
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 principles. No one can be pro-EU at the same time loyal to Kemalist 
principles.169
 
Retired commanders’ declarations reflect the military’s views in a more sincere 
manner since they do not have the obligation to satisfy the public opinion so as to 
maintain the TAF’s prestigious role in Turkish society.  
There are many other representatives of the Orthodox interpretation of 
Kemalism among the academicians and bureaucrats. Erol Manisalı is one of the most 
popular academicians who fall under the Orthodox category. Manisalı views pro-EU 
circles within Turkish society as the collaborators of the EU in its hidden agenda of 
dividing Turkey. He argues that most of the pro-EU “lobbyists” are anti-Kemalists, 
or at least they keep their distance from Atatürk and that they would be benefiting 
from weakening of Kemalism. Thus, he regards the TAF as the only institution that 
these powers cannot penetrate and he implies that the TAF have to continue fighting 
with the pro-EU lobby so as to protect Turkey’s national interests.170 Manisalı 
believes that the European states use the Kurdish problem as a pretense to delay 
Turkish accession, and even if Turkey grants Kurdish people cultural and political 
rights, or recognize their minority status; the Kurdish card would still be played by 
the European powers for two goals: to counter the US power among the Kurds of 
Northern Iraq by controlling the Kurdish population within Turkey and to weaken 
Turkey by a Kurdish insurgency in case Turkey shows signals of becoming a 
regional power.171 In this line of thinking Manisalı advocates merely an economic 
cooperation in even terms, without Turkey’s membership to the EU. 
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 All in all, Orthodox Kemalists are highly skeptical of the EU, its future and 
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the EU. In general terms, they all contend that the EU is 
trying to divide Turkey by classifying Alevis and Kurds as sectarian and ethnic 
minorities, and demanding cultural and political rights for these groups. They believe 
that the TAF have to oversee Turkish political development and the EU-Turkey 
relations in order to overcome these threats and preserve national and territorial 
integrity of Turkey. With regard to Turkey’s EU membership, by and large they 
presume that the EU plans to exploit Turkey both economically and geographically 
and will never let Turkey in. Thus they suggest that Turkey should try to become a 
regional power by remaining as a sovereign and strong state, which can rely upon its 
powerful military.   
 
4.2  Neo-Kemalists: Kemalism Meets Liberalism 
 
The changing face of Kemalism is ably observed by Nilüfer Göle, a 
reputable sociologist. Göle maintains that a tolerant version of Kemalism is on its 
way and Turkey is currently suffering from its labor pain.172 She argues that a new 
Kemalism has been emerging since the late 1980s, especially through flourishing of 
civil society. Ascendance of civil society organizations that shoulder the task of 
protecting and exalting Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, especially in the 
shape of women’s and youth organizations, gives signals of a new version of 
Kemalism, this time transforming the society from bottom to the top. She concedes 
that Turkish society is embracing Mustafa Kemal and his way of thinking, which had 
been strict taboos up until today, by demythologizing them: people read Atatürk’s 
life, they wear badges of Atatürk and they start to examine his thoughts. This new 
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 wave of Kemalism can be traced in social life, but not in the political scene yet. To 
conclude, Göle points that this “new version of tolerant Kemalism” inevitably will 
find its reflection in political life as well, and she contends that Kemal Derviş, who 
seeks to make a synthesis of modern social democracy and Kemalism is made for 
this mission of representing this new wave of Kemalism by drawing the thin line 
between orthodox Kemalism and the newly-emerging “tolerant Kemalism”.173  
This emerging “tolerant Kemalism” in Göle’s words is tantamount to the 
neo-Kemalist school of thought. This section analyzes the basic lines of neo-
Kemalist thinking regarding the Kurdish question, the Alevi question, the role of the 
military, and pooling of sovereignty for the sake of the EU membership; which 
constitute the theater of their clash with Orthodox Kemalists. 
Name of a prominent journalist, Andrew Mango can be spelled out under 
the neo-Kemalist category. He posits that Kemalism cannot be a stagnant ideology 
that is not open to change, since its author was a pragmatist and rational leader, who 
had to deal with the problems he faced.174 Thus, Mango suggests that Atatürk’s 
pragmatism can be utilized when handling today’s problems. His illustrative example 
is the Kurdish question. He contends that Atatürk’s opinions changed during and 
after the War of National Liberation and these changes led him to consider self-
government for local customs. Mango suggests using this attitude of Atatürk for 
legitimizing greater freedom to use foreign languages, such as Kurdish.175 Besides he 
responds to some assertions of Orthodox arguments with regard to the Kurdish 
question. Mango argues that the claim of granting cultural rights to the Kurdish 
community would inevitably lead to a disorder in other ethnic communities in 
Turkey does not make sense at all. In Mango’s words, 
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 The Laz see themselves as frontiersman of Islam and defenders of the 
Turkish state. The urban Arabs of southern Turkey were good 
Ottomans under the sultans and are good Turkish citizens today…Thus 
it carries little force to argue that if concessions are made to Kurdish 
nationalism, Turkish citizens of other ethnic origins might wish to 
imitate the Kurds and in so doing break up the mosaic of Turkish 
society and destroy the Turkish state…The Kurds are a case apart, first 
and foremost, by reason of their number.176
 
What Mango prescribes for resolution of the Kurdish problem is three-
phased. First one is to grant full cultural rights to the Kurds, second one is to 
strengthen local governments and finally to remove all barriers on the way of 
formation of non-violent political parties, including ethnic and regional ones. Mango 
goes on to conclude that the lifting of the ban on ethnic parties would end up in 
numerous political parties that would reflect “the deep divisions within the Kurdish 
society.”177 It can be inferred that Andrew Mango does not regard the present 
policies concerning the Kurdish problem as adequate and that he urges for a revision 
in this policy area, which would also be in compliance with the pragmatist and 
reformist essence of Kemalist thinking. 
Another question that is dealt by Mango is whether pooling of sovereignty 
and the EU membership in general are compatible with Kemalist thinking. He argues 
that Atatürk’s practices such as membership of the League of Nations and of the 
International Court of Justice in the Hague implies that he did not refrain from 
curbing part of the national sovereignty for the sake of the country’s welfare.178
Another representative of the neo-Kemalist group is a retired bureaucrat, 
former president of the Court of Cassation, Sami Selçuk. Selçuk acknowledges that 
Kemalism was transformed into a frozen ideology, by imposing the 1930s to the 
1990s in a world that is almost being rebuilt everyday. He is also aware that the word 
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 Atatürk occupies a central position in the Turkish society. 179 Thus what he advocates 
is abandoning the authoritarian practices that belong to the 1930s and consolidating 
pluralist democracy.  
Selçuk observes the practices of the 1930s mostly in state-society and state-
religion relations. With regard to state-religion relations he argues that compulsory 
religious courses threatens laicité, since opening and financing schools that promote 
a certain religion and sect as well as incorporating a certain religion and a sect into 
the state organization means that the previously mentioned state has a religion and a 
sect.180 Therefore, he takes side with the Alevi community and the EU concerning 
their demands of state’s neutrality towards different sects of Islam. Selçuk’s 
suggestion with regard to state-religion relations is as follows: 
During the War of Independence, it is known that Atatürk and his 
colleagues, who were very worried about the exploitation of religion, 
kept it under close supervision and this was very rational behavior. 
However, this behavior cannot be continued in a pluralist society. 
Institutions and regulations need to achieve even-handedness.181   
 
It can be inferred from some of Selçuk’s general statements that he also 
urges the state to ease its policies towards the use of Kurdish language and the right 
to broadcasting in and teaching of languages other than Turkish. Selçuk argues that a 
pluralist democracy shall not embrace a hegemonic identity since it is bound to reject 
dogmas and dogmatism. He believes in the richness and potential for development 
that pluralism brings upon a society and he holds that each culture is entitled to 
receive impartial treatment by the state and law. 182 Thus, it can be safely argued that 
Selçuk regards granting cultural rights to the Kurds as an important part of 
democratization in Turkey. 
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 Although Selçuk does not make blunt comments regarding the role of the 
military, he concludes his words by rejecting “degenerated democracy which is 
permitted under the supervision of big brothers. I want the highest democracy in the 
sense of a government of a people made up of free individuals by the people and for 
the people.”183 Needless to mention that the term “big brothers” stands for the TAF, 
and it is evident that Selçuk regards extensive role of the military in Turkish political 
life as contrary to the principle of national sovereignty, which is one of the 
fundamental components of Kemalism. 
With regard to the EU membership, Selçuk holds that the EU membership 
is just an offshoot of consolidation of democracy in Turkey. He contends that we still 
lag far behind of what Atatürk dreamt of, however he is still hopeful that Turkish 
society can arrive at democracy in a short time and that after then Turkey will join 
the EU. In Selçuk’s words: 
There will be a spin-off of this [democratization]: Turkey will join the 
European Union. All the same, the Turkish people want seamless 
democracy not for joining in this Union, but for its development and 
happiness. In this context, the codes of European Union and the consent 
of the Turkish people are in juxtaposition.184
 
In this manner, it can be inferred that Selçuk recognizes the compatibility of 
Kemalism with the EU membership and consolidation of pluralist democracy, 
despite long-drawn-out practices of Orthodox Kemalists to transform Kemalism into 
a rigid ideology. He wants “the return of the radiant Atatürk with the civilized face 
and the Kemalism which is not trapped in the 1930s.”185
Neo-Kemalist view receives backing from numerous columnists as well. 
Hasan Cemal is one of these journalists who articulate neo-Kemalist views in his 
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 articles. In response to the arguments claiming that what Atatürk meant by 
‘contemporary civilization’ was not necessarily Europe, he argues that Atatürk 
inevitably had to point at Europe as the ‘contemporary civilization’ since at that time 
there was no modern civilization other than Europe. He continues by reminding that 
“that was the reason why Atatürk adopted Commercial Law from Germany, Civil 
Code from Switzerland and the model of unitary and laicist state from France.”186 In 
this line of thinking, he notes that the EU membership is compatible with “Atatürk’s 
path” and that Turkey should not turn its eyes off of the EU. Cemal also touches 
upon the Kurdish and the Alevi questions in his articles. He maintains that denying 
these identities and forbidding their reflections in social life aggravates the 
problems.187 What he prescribes, like other neo-Kemalists, is to look through the 
lenses of the 21st century instead of the lenses that belong to the 1930s. He thinks that 
the concepts of national sovereignty, democracy and rule of law are changing in 
Turkey due to the EU conditionality; and that Turkey should handle its problems 
such as the Kurdish and the Alevi questions by developing tools and policies that 
correspond to this changing juncture.188
İsmet Berkan expresses parallel views in his column. He argues that Turkey 
has matured its democracy in years, and Turkish democracy was put to the test 
during the transition years to multi-party politics in the 1950s. He contends that if 
Turkey was not partitioned or Turkish democracy was not jeopardized by a 
noteworthy movement during those years, neither does it today. In this manner he 
concludes by saying that freedom of expressing ethnic and religious identities is not a 
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 threat for the Republic, these freedoms would only consolidate Republican regime 
and bolster citizens’ loyalty to the state.189  
In the light of these views it can be argued that a great deal of pressure for 
revising Kemalism is coming from various circles of Turkish society and forming a 
vocal neo-Kemalist group. By and large members of neo-Kemalist group view 
Kemalism as being capable of adaptation “without having to strain at some doctrinal 
leash”190 and look for a more flexible interpretation of it that can have a say in 
today’s more integrated world. They believe that most elements of Kemalism are still 
applicable in the present day; such as its longing for establishing democracy by 
taking scientific thinking as a guide, its pragmatism and reformism to achieve that. 
Therefore this group puts into interrogation the orthodox interpretation of Kemalism 
that has prevailed since the 1980s, so as to renovate the so-called Kemalist ideology 
to its original form, which is much milder and laxer; and this interrogation naturally 
starts by an examination of the nature of Kemalism. 
Neo-Kemalists do not view Kemalism as a full-fledged ideology that 
suppresses criticism and civil society. They argue that although it was not an 
ideology and Atatürk was not an ideologue, the military had transformed it into a 
rigid ideology by ignoring its reformist and democratic aspirations. They blame 
orthodoxs for being stuck in the 1930s, and seeing the world through that time’s 
perspective by disregarding Atatürk’s devotion for reaching the level of 
contemporary civilization, democracy, human rights and pluralism, which are 
applicable today.  
This common assertion is the point they diverge from anti-Kemalists. 
Although anti-Kemalists maintain that Atatürk had never been and never aimed to be 
                                                          
189 İsmet Berkan,”Cumhuriyet’in Değerini Bilmek ve Onu İleri Götürmek,” Radikal, 29 October 2004. 
190 Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford ; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), 91. 
 80
 fully democratic; that his main purpose had been to preserve the state’s strict control 
over the people; and that he was a social engineer planning to transform Turkish 
society so as to create an obedient and homogeneous nation; neo-Kemalists believe 
that Kemalism, in its essence, is a flexible, pragmatist and civilizationist world view 
that does not aim at creating an ideology which has a claim to explain everything 
under the sun.  Thus while anti-Kemalists favor wholesale abandonment of 
Kemalism, neo-Kemalists advocate revision of it in accordance with the changing 
political juncture. 
What neo-Kemalists prescribe for today is modernization as a self-
propelling societal process that focuses on the individual, instead of modernization 
from above. Neo-Kemalists argue that it is the time to advance Kemalist reforms one 
step further, it is time for the people to become the subjects of modernization project 
instead of being its objects in the face of a changing world, in which individualism is 
being praised more than ever. Parallel to this, custodianship role of the military has 
to be downgraded gradually while Turkish society matures in time.   
For neo-Kemalists, changing conjuncture pushes Turkey to pursue a more 
democratic, and evolutionary rather than a revolutionary path. Up until now, 
citizenship has been based on responsibilities of the people against the state rather 
than their rights and freedoms. Today it is time to reverse the picture, and 
recognizing the identities that have been marginalized by the state is a good start 
trying to that.  
Neo-Kemalists view the EU membership as an extension of Kemalist 
thought that had set its sight on reaching the level of contemporary civilization, 
which is undoubtedly led by the West. They push the principles of civilizationism, 
reformism, populism and respect for human rights, democracy and pragmatism that 
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 are embedded within the Kemalist thinking to the forefront, and build their new 
interpretation on these principles, which are also compatible with the changing 
conjuncture and the EU conditionality today.   
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                                      CONCLUSION 
 
It is a fact that the prospect of the EU membership and the EU 
conditionality has borne great deal of influence over Turkish political system and the 
society. So much that almost every complaint includes the resentment about how we 
can join the EU without changing our mentality. Thus it is clear that Turkish society 
as a whole have been going through change. Kemalism also took its share from this 
dynamic of change and is inevitably exposed to the impacts of the EU conditionality 
just like other components of Turkish political system.  
Since the time of its first formulation, almost every political movement 
claimed to be the true owner of Kemalism: Islamists tried to convince people that if 
Atatürk was alive he would have been a member of their party, the leader of the PKK 
terrorist group declared that he was sympathizing Atatürk, the list reaches even to the 
communists. This is due to the flexible nature of Kemalism, which can be classified 
as an outlook in its essence. An outlook that everybody could grab a part of and 
claim that the part he holds is the real core of it. Although Kemalism was formulated 
as an outlook based on scientific thinking, pragmatism and flexibility, 1980 military 
coup transformed it into a rigid ideology that was based on Kemalist nationalism and 
on Turkish historical and moral values, and imposed on the Turkish society and 
polity. This approach inevitably brought about a restrictive attitude towards the 
Kurdish question, the Alevi problem, enhanced the role of the TAF in Turkish 
political system, the issues that have constituted the core of the problems of Turkey 
in complying with the Copenhagen political criteria. Although the 1980 military 
intervention did not refrain from limiting sovereignty, advocates of the post-1980 
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 practices—namely the orthodox Kemalists-- favor not giving upon sovereignty and 
not becoming a member of the EU.  
However Turkey’s long-drawn-out journey with the EU and the EU 
conditionality that is expressed in progress reports and Accession Partnership 
documents indicate that it is impossible to go on with the prevalent interpretation of 
Kemalism. Contrary to the orthodox-Kemalists, who are the owner of the present 
ideology, and anti-Kemalists who prefer wholesale abandonment of Kemalism and 
references to Atatürk, a newly emerging neo-Kemalist group that is propelled by the 
EU conditionality try to keep Atatürk as a reference for a long time by setting his 
reformism, pragmatism and goal of catching up with the contemporary civilization as 
its core principles, and by reestablishing it as an outlook again in order to make it 
compatible with the different requirements of the day. By delineating the nature of 
Kemalism as its devotion to science and civilizationism, and its pragmatic 
orientation, this group tries to deconstruct and rebuild the Kemalist ideology. In the 
bottom line they try to prove that the EU membership is compatible with Atatürk’s 
goal of civilizationism and his long-term targets such as consolidated democracy and 
respect for human rights. Thus, for them the EU membership grows directly out of 
the very essence of Kemalism itself. 
It is too early to announce the end of Kemalism or its failure to modernize 
Turkish society. Turkey has the capacity of becoming a modern state in the fullest 
sense due to its goal of modernization that is a century old. Kemalist thinking has 
somehow survived for 70 years regardless of the changing conjuncture and it owes 
its resilience to its flexibility and pragmatism. As Süleyman Demirel puts, “Atatürk 
has to be our reference even in the next century, since we have witnessed the demise 
 84
 of other references such as religion or ethnicity.”191 Thus, neo-Kemalists are aware 
of this fact and they try to revise Kemalism so as to reestablish it as an outlook based 
on pragmatism and civilizationism that is not strained by the idea of EU membership.    
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